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Beyond Crime and Commitment: 
Justifying Liberty Deprivations of the 
Dangerous and Responsible 
Kimberly Kessler Ferzan† 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a range of dangerous persons who walk among us. 
The sexual predator who intends to molest a child. The terror-
ist who plans to bomb a public square. The psychopath who will 
inflict injury without remorse. The determined killer who aims 
to end the life of another. 
We want the State to protect us from these dangerous 
people. Truth be told, we want the State to lock them up. The 
scholarly literature argues that the law approaches dangerous-
ness from two distinct and irreducible vantage points. These 
are ―disease,‖ where the State may prevent and confine, and 
―desert,‖ where it may punish and incarcerate.1 If the State de-
nies the agent is a responsible agent, it can detain him. It can 
treat him as it treats other non-responsible agents, as a threat 
to be dealt with, without fear of infringing his liberty or auton-
omy interests. With respect to responsible actors, the State can 
use the criminal law. It can punish the deserving for the com-
mission of a crime. For a responsible agent, the State should 
not intervene in any substantial liberty-depriving way prior to 
 
†  Professor of Law, Rutgers University, School of Law–Camden. I bene-
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Eastern Division meeting, the University of San Diego Law School‘s Confer-
ence on the Morality of Preventive Restrictions, and at the Rutgers—Camden 
Law School‘s faculty colloquium. For comments on the manuscript or helpful 
questions at the conferences, I thank Larry Alexander, Andrew Ashworth, 
Mitch Berman, Roger Clark, Joshua Dressler, Ken Ehrenberg, Doug Husak, 
David Luban, Stephen Morse, Dennis Patterson, George Sher, Allan Stein, 
Rick Swedloff, Alec Walen, Peter Westen, and Lucia Zedner. Copyright © 2011 
by Kimberly Kessler Ferzan. 
 1. Stephen Morse originally framed the dichotomy this way. Stephen J. 
Morse, Neither Desert Nor Disease, 5 LEGAL THEORY 265, 266 (1999). 
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his commission of an offense for fear of denying his autonomy. 
The State must respect that a responsible agent may choose not 
to commit an offense. It cannot detain an actor for who he is. It 
must wait to see what he will do. Thus, to the extent that we 
have preventive practices that do not fit either model, these 
mechanisms are typically condemned as unjust.2  
This choice between crime and commitment leaves a gap.3 
We have no justification for substantial intervention against 
responsible agents prior to when they have committed a crimi-
nal offense.4 We have no theory of when or why we may engage 
in substantial liberty deprivations of dangerous and responsi-
ble actors. This Article bridges that gap. It offers an account of 
how, in one class of cases, the actor has made himself liable to 
preventive interference and thus cannot object that the liberty 
deprivation violates his rights.  
How should we understand the relationship between pre-
vention and punishment? At first blush, prevention and pun-
ishment seem to be conceptually distinct. Prevention looks for-
ward. Punishment looks backwards. Prevention looks at what a 
person will do. Punishment looks at what a person has done. 
Prevention does not care about responsibility. Punishment re-
quires the actor to be responsible. As Christopher Slobogin ar-
ticulates the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence in this area:  
Criminal punishment is based solely upon a conviction for an offense 
and can occur only if there is such a conviction. Preventive detention 
is based solely upon a prediction concerning future offenses and can 
occur only if there is such a prediction. Therefore, preventive deten-
tion is not criminal punishment. Indeed, the concept of ―punishment‖ 
for some future act is incoherent.5 
 
 2. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: 
Comments on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sex-
ually Violent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 96 (1996) (―In 
the absence of mental illness sufficiently serious to preclude criminal respon-
sibility, predictive confinement violates the first principle of limited govern-
ment—to treat every mentally competent adult as a free and autonomous per-
son responsible for his chosen actions—and only for his chosen actions.‖). 
 3. This is Morse‘s term. Stephen J. Morse, Preventive Confinement of 
Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 56 (2004).  
 4. See id. at 58 (―We cannot detain [dangerous people] unless they de-
serve it and desert requires wrongdoing. In the interest of liberty, we leave 
potentially dangerous people free to pursue their projects until they actually 
offend, even if their future wrongdoing is quite certain. Indeed, we are willing 
to take great risks in the name of liberty.‖). 
 5. Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1, 12 (2003). 
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Scholars warn against allowing punishment practices to fo-
cus on dangerousness, and conversely, of allowing commitment 
models to capture responsible actors.6 For instance, Paul H. 
Robinson argues that the current criminal law ―cloaks‖ preven-
tive practices as punishment.7 As Robinson rightly notes, three 
strikes laws and other habitual offender penalties increase the 
amount of punishment not based on what the agent deserves, 
but based upon how dangerous he is.8 This contorts the crimi-
nal law. 
Simultaneously, the Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence on the 
involuntary detention of sexual predators has drawn scholarly 
criticism.9 The test employed by the Court, which allows con-
finement of those with a mental disorder and an inability to 
control their conduct, fails to differentiate ―the bad,‖ who de-
serve punishment, from ―the mad,‖ who ought to be confined.10 
The problem, as Eric Janus notes, is that although the Court 
wishes to maintain that ―people subject to civil commitment 
must in some sense be different from ordinary recidivist crimi-
nals,‖11 the test adopted fails to meet this requirement because 
―impaired self-control is not a ‗diagnosis‘ or a ‗mental disorder‘ 
that makes sex offenders different from other criminals—it is 
 
 6. PAUL H. ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW: 
WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? 121 (2008) (―The cloaking of preven-
tive detention as criminal justice is problematic in part because it undermines 
justice.‖); Morse, supra note 3, at 65 (calling recent Supreme Court decisions 
allowing civil commitment of sex offenders ―a real, broad and profound threat 
to liberty, to the distinction between crime and disorder, and to the consequent 
distinction between civil and criminal confinement‖); Carol S. Steiker, Pun-
ishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural 
Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 794 (1997) (noting the ―bleeding‖ and ―blurring‖ be-
tween criminal justice and mental health). 
 7. Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive De-
tention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1444–48 (2001). 
 8. ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 122; see also Morse, supra note 3, at 66–67 
(noting that enhanced sentencing laws are an erosion of desert). But see 
Youngjae Lee, Recidivism as Omission: A Relational Account, 87 TEX. L. REV. 
571, 573–78 (2009) (offering a retributivist‘s defense of sentencing enhance-
ments for repeat offenders). 
 9. The two major recent cases in this field are Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 
407, 413 (2002), and Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 US. 346, 357 (1997). 
 10. Morse, supra note 3, at 62 (―[The] circular definition collapses the 
clichéd distinction between ‗badness‘ and ‗madness,‘ which is precisely the dis-
tinction the definition is meant to achieve to justify civil rather than criminal 
commitment.‖). 
 11. ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA‘S SEXUAL PREDATOR 
LAWS AND THE RISE OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 39 (2006) (citations omitted). 
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precisely what makes them similar to other criminals.‖12 And 
Stephen Morse denounces the ―mental abnormality‖ criterion 
approved by the Supreme Court in Kansas v. Crane and Kansas 
v. Hendricks as ―obscure, circular, and mostly incoherent.‖13 
The message scholars are sending is clear: prevention and pu-
nishment are two distinct practices, but in both instances, the 
State is failing to maintain the clear boundaries between the 
two.14 
Although punishment and prevention are thus presented 
as non-overlapping practices, there is significant overlap that 
ought to be acknowledged. First, criminalization of conduct re-
duces that conduct.15 Second, theorists who subscribe to a 
mixed view as to the justification for punishment find desert to 
be a necessary but insufficient criterion for punishment.16 That 
is, mixed theorists believe we should punish if the offender de-
serves it and the punishment will prevent crimes, through de-
terrence or incapacitation. Moreover, in the real world, a world 
of limited resources where we cannot give everyone the pu-
nishment they deserve, one particularly good way to choose 
which criminals to focus upon is by looking to what other bene-
fits accrue by punishing them.17  
A third way that desert can intersect with preventive goals 
is by way of the mode of punishment. When we are selecting 
 
 12. Id. at 103. 
 13. Morse, supra note 3, at 62; see also Crane, 534 U.S. at 413–14; Hen-
dricks, 521 U.S. at 358. 
 14. See, e.g., Steiker, supra note 6, at 793–94 (condemning trends that 
―subordinate the distinction between ‗mad‘ and ‗bad‘ to the need for protection 
from the ‗dangerous‘‖). 
 15. Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive Ratio-
nales and the Limits of the Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
THE CRIMINAL LAW 281 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011) (―[E]ven the 
purest retributivists must recognize that a concomitant of the decision to declare 
certain conduct to be a serious wrong and therefore criminal is a commitment to 
reduce the frequency of that conduct.‖); see also LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY 
KESSLER FERZAN WITH STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY 
OF CRIMINAL LAW 3, 6 (2009) (noting ―the criminal law aims at preventing 
harm‖ and ―the criminal law both creates and reflects value by announcing 
which conduct is sufficiently wrong to deserve blame and punishment‖).  
 16. See MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW 93 (1997) (describing two kinds of mixed theories: one in which 
we punish only those who deserve it but only because social gain is achieved, 
and the other in which we punish people because they deserve it but only in 
instances where some social gain is also achieved).  
 17. For a discussion of the puzzle of applying retributive theory to the 
practical limitations in the real world, see Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Jus-
tice in the Real World, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 815, 816–25 (2007). 
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how we punish—the mode of punishment—we may also decide 
that incarceration is a particularly important mode of punish-
ment for the dangerous.18 (To put the point another way, we 
could simply cut off a criminal‘s left hand as punishment, but 
that would mean that a mere few weeks after his sentencing, 
he would be standing behind you in the Starbucks line ordering 
a nonfat mocha Frappuccino). Hence, we could reserve impri-
sonment for dangerous offenders, thus getting the benefit of in-
capacitation, and use other punishment mechanisms for of-
fenders who are not dangerous and do not need to be 
detained.19 Notably, the amount of punishment would then be 
determined by desert, but the method of punishment would be 
dictated by other factors.20 
Finally, as a theoretical matter, prevention and punish-
ment appear to play on the same normative and epistemic turf. 
Epistemically, both practices fear false positives, as both result 
in significant injustices—the punishment of the innocent or the 
detention of someone who would not harm others.21 Normative-
ly, both practices ask when a State may interfere with an indi-
vidual‘s liberty. And both practices also may be constrained by 
other values. A retributivist might believe that the death pen-
alty is what certain offenders deserve, but because it is applied 
in a racist manner, it should not be used.22 Prevention prin-
ciples are likewise constrained by equality concerns. When pre-
vention requires a focus on certain groups, this focused preven-
 
 18. Carol Steiker claims that the use of incarceration for both punishment 
and preventive purposes has further blurred the civil-criminal divide. See 
Steiker, supra note 6, at 796–97. 
 19. Dan Kahan argues that imprisonment is an important mode of pun-
ishment because of its social meaning in expressing condemnation. See Dan M. 
Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 594–
601 (1996). However, even if all forms of punishment are not equivalent in 
their meanings, society might still pursue other modes of punishment that 
could eventually take on equivalent social meanings. Moreover, at some point, 
perfect communication of condemnation may simply be too costly. 
 20. See ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 251, 253–54 (noting this possibility). 
 21. See Denise Meyerson, Risks, Rights, Statistics and Compulsory Meas-
ures, 31 SYDNEY L. REV. 507, 510 (2009) (noting that if 400 people are de-
tained ―on the basis that three in four of them will re-offend, 100 harmless in-
dividuals—false positives—will be imprisoned unnecessarily‖); Peter Westen, 
Two Rules of Legality in Criminal Law, 26 LAW & PHIL. 229, 283 (2007) (―Of 
all the injustices that can be wrongly inflicted in the name of a people, there is 
scarcely any as great as punishing a person—and, thus, holding him out to de-
serve to suffer hard treatment by virtue of having engaged in prohibited con-
duct—when he did not engage in the conduct the statute prohibits . . . .‖). 
 22. Cf. MOORE, supra note 16, at 151 (―[T]he costs to other values of at-
taining a certain form of justice[ ] is always a relevant concern.‖). 
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tion threatens to undermine equality, stigmatize groups, and 
mask authoritarian state regimes.23  
Thus, the view that punishment and prevention are wholly 
independent sorts of inquiries grossly oversimplifies their rela-
tionship. However, the problem is not just that the literature 
has lacked the requisite degree of nuance. The problem is that 
this way of looking at the practices has blinded us to a familiar 
predictive practice that is grounded in responsible agency. We 
can have a model that looks not only at what the agent has 
done but also at what he will do. Sometimes what actors do jus-
tifies acting on predictions of what they might do in the future. 
This is the framework of self-defense.24 What the aggressor has 
done grounds the defender‘s right to act on the prediction of 
what he will do.25  
The false assumption that we must choose between predic-
tion and responsibility has blinded theorists to how and why 
preventive interference is sometimes justified short of state 
punishment. This Article fills that chasm. The self-defense 
 
 23. See DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTI-
TUTION 197 (New Press, 3d ed. 2006) (2002) (criticizing the Patriot Act because 
―by reserving its harshest measures for immigrants, measures directed pre-
dominantly at Arab and Muslim immigrants, it sacrificed commitments to 
equality by trading a minority group‘s liberty for the majority‘s purported se-
curity—a trade that has from all objective measures proven ineffective‖); FRE-
DERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 190 (2003) 
(―Because allowing the use of race and ethnicity imposes a cost on those mem-
bers of targeted groups who are in the area of overinclusion—Middle Eastern-
ers who have done nothing wrong—it might be preferable to distribute the cost 
more broadly, and in doing so raise the cost without lowering the degree of se-
curity . . . . Put starkly, the question of racial or ethnic profiling in air travel is 
not the question of whether racial and ethnic sensitivity must be bought at the 
price of thousands of lives. Rather, it is most often the question of whether ra-
cial and ethnic sensitivity should be bought at the price of arriving thirty [mi-
nutes] earlier to the airport.‖); Meyerson, supra note 21, at 528 (arguing that 
when a regulating measure ―affects fundamental interests such as liberty or 
privacy, or is based on invidious classifications which tend to be an arbitrary 
or irrelevant basis for different treatment, or strikes at the value of free 
choice, balancing the costs to the mistakenly affected individuals against the 
public‘s interest in security will be illegitimate‖). 
 24. As delineated below, the liability-based theory of self-defense I en-
dorse does not rule out other alternative justifications for self-defense‘s per-
missibility. See infra Part II.A. 
 25. Stephen Morse suggests that the ―principles akin to those that under-
write individual self-defense would justify limited pure preemption . . . .‖ 
Morse, supra note 1. However, Morse‘s theory of self-defense, based solely on 
the defender‘s need to act, ignores the possibility of liability-based preventive 
interference. Thus, though he gestures at self-defense, he falsely assumes that 
self-defense is part of a purely predictive model. See id. at 294–303. 
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model demonstrates that there are grounds for substantially 
depriving responsible agents of their liberty to prevent their fu-
ture crimes.  
Part I argues that rather than having two concepts—desert 
and disease—we have three: desert, disease, and liability to 
preventive force. This Part first reviews the current state of the 
desert/disease analysis and then introduces the third perspec-
tive—liability to defense. The self-defense literature has recent-
ly spawned the concept of ―liability to defensive force.‖ Liability 
explains why the defender does not wrong the aggressor—
because the aggressor by his own culpable attack has forfeited 
his rights against the defender‘s use of force against him.  
 Part II makes the case for a predictive practice grounded in 
responsible agency, and argues that the normative principles 
that underlie self-defense are directly applicable to preventive 
interference generally. Self-defense and liability to preventive 
interference have the same normative structure. Both are pre-
ventive principles grounded in responsible action. Part II be-
gins by making conceptual space for this interference against 
criminal endeavors—a space currently occupied by preparatory 
offenses and attempts. Part II next sketches out the require-
ments for preventive interference, including both a culpable 
mind and an overt act, as well as how the State may intervene, 
using the United Kingdom‘s civil preventive mechanism em-
ployed to prevent terrorist acts—the control order—as a possi-
ble model.26 Part II then addresses potential distinctions be-
tween the two practices, including that self-defensive actions 
are only authorized when a harm is imminent and that the na-
ture of a self-defensive response is short lived. Part II argues 
that neither of these restrictions on individual self-defense has 
any normative traction when applied to State action. The Part 
concludes with an example of how this regime would work to 
prevent a criminal act by a sexual predator. 
Part III addresses potential objections to the preventive in-
terference approach. These objections include whether this 
model is sufficiently autonomy-respecting, whether it is proper-
ly a civil, as opposed to criminal, mechanism, whether it is af-
fordable, and, finally, whether it will conceptually and norma-
 
 26. Control orders will be replaced with ―terrorism prevention and investi-
gation measures‖ (TPIMs). In substance, these measures remain largely the 
same. See Matthew Ryder, Control Orders Have Been Rebranded. Big Problems 
Remain., THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 28, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis 
free/libertycentral/2011/jan/28/control-orders-protection-of-freedoms-bill. 
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tively collapse into a pure preventive regime. Part III argues 
that this model does respect the actor‘s autonomy and can pro-
vide the actor with sufficient constitutional protections, even 
outside the criminal law. It further argues that any govern-
ment must make trade-offs in determining how to allocate re-
sources, but this regime is unlikely to be more expensive than 
the resort to the criminal law. Finally, Part III claims that the 
principles that underlie this regime do not inevitably endorse a 
pure preventive-detention system, and that the regime can be 
practically implemented in a way that takes responsibility  
seriously. 
I.  FROM DESERT AND DISEASE TO ―LIABILITY TO 
DEFENSE‖   
The general view is that prevention and punishment are 
logically and conceptually distinct.27 Punishment focuses on 
past conduct by responsible agents. Prevention looks toward 
the future and stops dangerous persons; responsibility is irrele-
vant. Prevention also does not care whether the person has 
acted. Actions are only evidence of dangerousness, but, concep-
tually and normatively, action is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for a preventive response. The concern is that prevention 
stops a person based on who he is. Punishment, on the other 
hand, is a reaction to what he has done.  
This picture ignores a common preventive practice that 
looks to what someone has done in the past to ground a predic-
tive response—self-defense. In justifying self-defense, someone 
may become liable to preventive force—a predictive behavior—
based upon what she has done: culpably attack the defender.28 
This section articulates the normative and conceptual bounda-
ries of these three practices: punishment, prevention, and lia-
bility to defensive force.  
 
 27. See ROBINSON, supra note 6, at 113 (―[I]t is logically impossible to ‗pu-
nish dangerousness‘ . . . .‖). 
 28. I defend the view that culpability is required for liability to defensive 
force. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Culpable Aggression: The Basis for Moral 
Liability to Defensive Killing, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming Spring 2012) 
(manuscript at 4), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=1947277##. This is not to say that other defensive killings may not also be 
justified or excused. See infra Part I.C.  
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A. PUNISHMENT 
Although we may criminalize actions to prevent harms, we 
should only punish those individuals who deserve it. Indeed, a 
system without a desert component, at least as a necessary 
condition, could quickly reduce to pure prevention. Without re-
quiring that the defendant do something blameworthy, the 
State could intervene simply to stop other people or to stop the 
defendant, and neither of these consequences logically require 
any action by the defendant at all.  
There are many competing theories of retributivism. I will 
not defend an account of retributivism here; instead I wish to 
focus on three features of retributivism as Larry Alexander and 
I have explicated it elsewhere: (1) that it is intrinsically good to 
punish the guilty as much as they deserve, (2) that it is intrin-
sically bad to punish the innocent mistakenly, and (3) that it is 
impermissible to intentionally punish the innocent.29  
First, it is intrinsically good to give wrongdoers what they 
deserve.30 If someone has done something wrong, it is a good 
thing for that person to be punished for it. If Alex has commit-
ted a murder, the State has an affirmative reason to make Alex 
suffer stigma and harsh treatment in response. Retributivism 
also speaks to the quantum of punishment. The more blame-
worthy the act, the more punishment the defendant deserves. 
Alex‘s murder ought to be punished more than, say, Bob‘s de-
struction of property. That is, proportionality is a component of 
retributivism.31  
Retributivism is not just concerned with the intrinsic 
goodness of deserved suffering but also speaks to the intrinsic 
badness of undeserved suffering.32 Thus, retributivists need not 
be insensitive to the error rates between false positives and 
false negatives. Indeed, the proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt 
 
 29. ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 3–19; Cahill, 
supra note 17, at 833–34, 855–56. 
 30. See MOORE, supra note 16, at 87–88 (arguing that for the retributivist, 
―[p]unishment of the guilty is . . . an intrinsic good‖); Mitchell N. Berman, Two 
Kinds of Retributivism, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW, 
supra note 15 at 433, 439 (offering the formulation that ―it is intrinsically good 
(or intrinsically valuable) that one who has engaged in wrongdoing suffer on 
account of, and in proportion to, his blameworthy wrongdoing‖).  
 31. ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 8 (―[N]o one 
should be (knowingly) punished more than that person deserves.‖). 
 32. See MOORE, supra note 16, at 87–88.  
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formulation manifests this belief that it is worse for an individ-
ual to be falsely convicted than for a guilty man to walk free.33 
Retributivists also believe that we may not intentionally 
punish the innocent. We cannot frame an innocent man and 
punish him for a crime he has not committed, even if this ac-
tion will prevent other crimes. Although there are some ques-
tions about how we should precisely formulate this side-
constraint, retributivism takes seriously the view that whatev-
er the consequences, it is impermissible to use an innocent per-
son as a scapegoat.34 
Theorists have questioned how retributivism ought to be 
applied in the real world.35 Larry Alexander and I have distin-
guished between strong, moderate, and weak retributivists.36 
In this respect, the moderate retributivist position is most de-
fensible.37 Weak retributivists are wrong to hold that all that is 
required is that we not (intentionally) punish the innocent. Ra-
ther, the fact that someone deserves punishment does give us 
an affirmative reason to punish him.38 Strong retributivists 
take too stringent a position on punishment in comparison to 
other social goods. We should not, as strong retributivists 
maintain, punish the guilty come what may.39 Rather, the view 
that is most sound is that giving the guilty what they deserve is 
one intrinsic good that the government should pursue, but this 
good must be balanced against other intrinsic goods. Money 
spent on punishment is money not spent on education, health 
care, and feeding the poor. Moreover, if money is spent on feed-
 
 33. Cf. sources cited supra note 21. 
 34. See Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Pluralism, in RETRIBUTIVISM: ES-
SAYS ON THEORY AND POLICY 25, 36 (Mark D. White ed., 2011) (―The principle 
of negative retributivism opposes imposition of undeserved punishment. The 
view is that punishing an innocent (in the sense of undeserving) person is not 
only harmful but morally wrong, and, perhaps, categorically forbidden.‖). But 
see MOORE, supra note 16, at 719–24 (noting that deontological side-
constraints have thresholds over which the constraint does not apply). 
 35. See generally Cahill, supra note 17 (discussing how retributive theory 
could be applied given practical limitations). 
 36. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 7–10 (de-
scribing the three positions and endorsing a moderate retributivist view). 
 37. See id. 
 38. For a thought experiment that is intended to lead to this conclusion, 
see MOORE, supra note 16, at 100–01 (arguing that even if no social good 
would be achieved, a rapist and robber ought to be punished). 
 39. See, e.g., ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 7 (de-
scribing why ―strong retributivism is too strong‖). 
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ing the poor or education, it may lead to less money needing to 
be spent on punishment.40  
A desert-based view thus requires the defendant to do 
something worthy of moral and legal condemnation before we 
incarcerate him.41 Once an actor has committed a blameworthy 
act, the State then has good reason to intervene.42 A culpable 
affront to a legally protected interest is a sufficient ground for 
State interference.43 Then the individual deserves to be  
punished.  
B. PURE PREVENTION 
Pure prevention stands at the opposite end of the spec-
trum. Although an exploration of the types of preventive deten-
tion, their moral justifiability, and their constitutional permis-
sibility could fill many articles, I wish to make a few points in 
this section. First, we have varying preventive-detention meas-
ures that the Supreme Court has held are constitutionally 
permissible. It is doubtful, however, whether some of these 
measures are morally justified. Second, even when the Court 
wishes to distinguish those who should be detained from those 
who should be punished—as it does in the sexual predator con-
text—the test articulated by the Court fails to provide a legally 
and morally principled distinction. Third, to the extent that we 
seek to make predictions, they are normatively problematic as 
predictions—individuals who are subjected to substantial liber-
ty deprivations based not on what they have done, but rather 
the statistical category under which they fall, can rightly claim 
that their autonomy and liberty are not being respected. They 
also face an uphill battle in disproving these predictions in 
their cases because of the political repercussions of false nega-
tives. Finally, as noted by other scholars, preventive measures 
should be non-punitive and compensated for, but it is doubtful 
 
 40. See id. at 172 (―It would be a crude caricature of the retributivist to 
make him monomaniacally focused on the achievement of retributive justice. 
The retributivist like anyone else can admit that there are other intrinsic 
goods, such as the goods protected by the rights to life, liberty, and bodily in-
tegrity. The retributivist can also admit that sometimes some of these rights 
will trump the achieving of retributive justice . . . .‖). 
 41. See generally ALEXANDER & FERZAN, WITH MORSE, supra note 15 (ar-
ticulating a culpability-based theory of criminal law); DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVER-
CRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW (2008) (defending the 
retributivist perspective and arguing that there are internal and external con-
straints on what may be criminalized). 
 42. See generally ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15. 
 43. Id. 
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that such measures can be practically implemented. These 
points are elaborated below.  
As Adam Klein and Benjamin Wittes catalog, the United 
States engages in many types of preventive-detention meas-
ures.44 These activities include wartime detention powers, the 
Suspension Clause, pretrial detention, material witness deten-
tion, detention of aliens, detention of the seriously mentally ill, 
quarantine, and protective custody powers.45 Studying these 
practices, Klein and Wittes argue against ―[t]he civic mythology 
of preventive detention [that] contends that American law ab-
hors the practice, or tolerates it only as an exception, in ex-
treme situations, to an otherwise strong norm.‖46 Klein and 
Wittes conclude that the ―unifying theme is that the law unsen-
timentally permits preventive detention where necessary but 
insists upon adequate means . . . of insuring both the accuracy 
of individual detention judgments and the necessity of those 
detentions.‖47 Moreover, ―triggers tend to develop that require a 
separate evaluation of both an underlying condition or status 
and a risk of harm.‖48  
As Alec Walen notes, ―However descriptively accurate this 
sort of utilitarian account of the law may be, it is nonetheless 
morally indefensible. It gives short shrift to the right to liberty 
of autonomous actors.‖49 This is not to say that we can never in-
fringe an individual‘s autonomy interests. Walen, for instance, 
argues that most short-term preventive-detention measures are 
permissible, as we can ask citizens to suffer limited liberty in-
terferences for the common good.50 The moral obligation to 
avoid infecting others may justify quarantine.51  
However, when we wish to substantially interfere with an 
individual‘s liberty to prevent him from harming us, theorists 
 
 44. Adam Klein & Benjamin Wittes, Preventive Detention in American 
Theory and Practice, 2 HARV. NAT‘L SECURITY J. 85, 87 (2011). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 186. 
 47. Id. at 187. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Alec Walen, A Punitive Precondition for Preventive Detention: Lost 
Status as a Foundation for a Lost Immunity, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcom-
ing 2011) (manuscript at 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1872984. 
 50. Id. (manuscript at 8). 
 51. The best justification for quarantine is that ―there may be an obliga-
tion to seclude oneself when dangerously ill if the disease is contagious 
enough, and the effects are serious enough.‖ Michael Louis Corrado, Punish-
ment and the Wild Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 778, 812 (1996). 
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decry the denial of the potential offender‘s autonomy. That is, 
when we detain someone because he might harm us, we treat 
him, as Stephen Morse aptly characterizes it, as ―bad bacte-
ria.‖52 In other words, we deny that he will choose wisely and 
just predict that he will cause harm.53 We thus treat him as a 
risk to be managed just as we manage disease.54 
The detention of sexual predators is one area in which we 
see the critical question of how to distinguish the non-
responsible, whom we may detain, from the responsible, whose 
autonomy we must respect. The Supreme Court‘s jurisprudence 
is clear—someone may only be detained if there is a showing 
beyond dangerousness.55 The Court unmistakably seeks to dis-
tinguish sexual predators who lack sufficient volitional control 
―from other dangerous persons who are perhaps more properly 
dealt with exclusively through criminal proceedings.‖56 That is, 
the task—even as the Court understands it—is to distinguish 
the ―bad‖ from the ―mad.‖57  
In Kansas v. Hendricks, Kansas sought to detain Leroy 
Hendricks, who was being released from prison after serving 
his sentence for child molestation.58 Hendricks admitted that 
he had uncontrollable urges to molest children and the only 
way he would stop would be ―to die.‖59 The Supreme Court held 
that Kansas‘s Act was constitutional when it required both past 
sexual behavior and ―a present mental condition that creates a 
likelihood of such conduct in the future if the person is not in-
capacitated.‖60 It later clarified in Kansas v. Crane that this 
 
 52. Morse, supra note 3, at 57. 
 53. Schulhofer, supra note 2. 
 54. See Corrado, supra note 51, at 779 (―[T]here is something very disturb-
ing about taking away the personal freedom of someone who has not yet vi-
olated the criminal law.‖); Alec Walen, A Unified Theory of Detention, with 
Application to Preventive Detention for Suspected Terrorists, 70 MD. L. REV. 
871, 877 (2011) (arguing ―that an individual may not be deprived of his liberty 
unless the reasons for doing so respect his status as an autonomous person‖). 
Walen describes such a person as one ―who has reached a threshold capacity to 
use practical reason to frame and pursue a conception of a good life . . . .‖ Id. at 
873 (footnote omitted). 
 55. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357–58 (1997). 
 56. Id. at 360. 
 57. See Morse, supra note 3, at 62. 
 58. 521 U.S. at 353–54. 
 59. Id. at 355.  
 60. Id. at 357–58. 
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mental disorder must be one where individuals have ―serious 
difficulty‖ controlling their behavior.61  
Unfortunately, this test is extraordinarily problematic. It is 
overbroad. First, the mental abnormality condition does no dis-
tinguishing work. Kansas‘s definition for mental abnormality is 
a ―congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or 
volitional capacity which predisposes the person to commit 
sexually violent offenses,‖62 but as Stephen Morse notes, ―the 
definition is simply a (partial) generic description of all beha-
vior and it is not a limiting definition of abnormality.‖63 Moreo-
ver, with respect to the lack of control criteria, there is a signif-
icant injustice at work here. The detainees in Crane and 
Hendricks were sex offenders who had already been criminally 
punished.64 If they could not control their conduct, then, as a 
normative matter, they should have been excused. The question 
of rationality should remain the same—if these actors are suffi-
ciently rational to choose to act, then they can be punished, but 
they cannot be detained. If they are sufficiently irrational that 
they ought to be detained, then they cannot be punished.65 The 
State should not be able to inconsistently maintain that these 
actors are responsible so it can punish them, and then based on 
the same facts, also maintain that they are non-responsible so 
it can detain them post-punishment. The State should be re-
quired to pick one view: either responsible and punishable or 
non-responsible and detainable.  
Proposed alternatives to the Court‘s test resurrect the 
same problems with finding a principle that respects autonomy. 
Noting that ―predicating preventive detention on a showing 
that a person‘s dangerousness is something he or she cannot 
control appears to be a theoretical and practical dead end,‖66 
Christopher Slobogin offers a criterion of ―undeterrability‖ for 
 
 61. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 412–13 (2002). 
 62. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (West 2010). 
 63. Morse, supra note 3, at 62. 
 64. 534 U.S. at 410–11; 521 U.S. at 553–54. 
 65. See Michael Louis Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, and 
Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. REV. 77, 107 (2005) (―If we are willing to rec-
ognize the man who cannot control his behavior, the arguments against ac-
cording him a responsibility defense fall flat. There is a very clear position 
here: if punishment is pointless, then it is inhumane to punish.‖); cases cited 
supra note 64. 
 66. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE 
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 132 (2006). 
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the pure prevention model.67 This model includes not only those 
who truly do not understand the nature of their acts but also 
those who know they will be punished but act anyway.68 The 
latter category includes everyone from those who kill abortion 
clinic doctors to terrorists—―[t]hey know they will either be 
caught or die, but are convinced their ideological agenda justi-
fies their actions and glorifies their punishment or death.‖69 
There is some question, however, whether Slobogin truly ad-
vances the ball, or whether his model likewise fails to distin-
guish the common criminal from the determined terrorist.70 As 
Michael Corrado notes, ―Every criminal takes a chance that he 
will be apprehended and punished. How great must the chance 
be before he moves from the category of the punishable into the 
category of the detainable?‖71 Indeed, Alec Walen adds, ―it is 
simply false that those who cannot be deterred because they 
are more dedicated to committing a crime than to avoiding pun-
ishment are outside the reach of the criminal law.‖72 
Even if we believed there was a good enough reason to de-
tain the dangerous, a range of problems remain. First, how 
should we go about selecting those individuals who should be 
detained? In doing so, we predict, and to predict we must assess 
risks. We assess risks because we do not know whether the in-
dividual will harm us or not. Because we do not have the know-
ledge of the omniscient, we assess the likelihood that some-
thing will happen based on the possession of some facts but not 
others. 
In law, when we say that there is a ―risk‖ of x ‘s occurrence, we are us-
ing ―risk‖ in the sense of relative frequency. That is, any given refer-
ence class will yield a relative frequency for an event‘s occurrence. 
However, one may formulate the reference class widely or narrowly, 
thus changing the relative frequency.73 
 
 67. Id. at 106. 
 68. Id. at 106, 132–38. 
 69. Id. at 137. 
 70. Michael Louis Corrado, Slobogin on Dehumanization, in CRIMINAL 
LAW CONVERSATIONS 75, 75–76 (Paul H. Robinson, Stephen P. Garvey & Kim-
berly Kessler Ferzan eds., 2009).  
 71. Corrado, supra note 65, at 108. 
 72. Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent: How to Un-
derstand the Law Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be Used 
Instead of Long-Term Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 811 n.33) (on file with author). 
 73. ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 29. For a clear 
explanation of risks, relative frequencies, and how risks are not themselves 
harms, see Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm, and Responsibility, in PHILOSOPHI-
CAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 321, 323 (David G. Owen ed., 1995). 
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The risk that you will die in a car accident is one number. The 
risk that you will die in a car accident in a rainstorm is anoth-
er. The risk that you will die in a car accident in a rainstorm on 
a Thursday is yet another number. The probability changes 
with the reference class. This means that the selection of the 
reference class affects the risk, and with respect to predictions 
of dangerousness, reference class selection alters how danger-
ous the individual appears to be. Some theorists doubt that 
there is a principled way to determine which reference class 
applies.74 Others observe that even after the selection of refer-
ence classes, the use of actuarial modeling relies on suspect 
human judgments.75  
The use of ―naked statistical evidence‖ may also be norma-
tively problematic.76 ―A piece of evidence is nakedly statistical 
 
 74. Meyerson, supra note 21, at 517 (―The point is that there are poten-
tially many unknown reference classes to which John belongs which might af-
fect the probability of his being guilty. Since the probability of his guilt 
changes depending on which reference class is chosen, this shows that mere 
membership in a reference class is insufficient to justify a finding of guilt.‖). 
On problems with reference classes and legal decision making generally, see 
Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Problematic Value of Mathematical 
Models of Evidence, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 112 (2007) (―[O]utside of the refer-
ence class consisting only of the event itself—nothing in the natural world pri-
vileges or picks out one of the classes as the right one . . . .‖); Mark Colyvan & 
Helen M. Regan, Legal Decisions and the Reference Class Problem, 11 INT‘L J. 
EVIDENCE & PROOF 274, 275 (2007). 
 75. See Lucia Zedner, Fixing the Future? The Pre-emptive Turn in Crimi-
nal Justice, in REGULATING DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMINALISA-
TION AND THE FUTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW 35, 41 (Bernadette McSherry et al. 
eds., 2009) (―Risk assessment of human behaviour is better understood not as 
the impartial application of technology . . . but as the institutionalisation of 
subjective opinions, prior political leanings, and prejudices. While technology 
itself is neutral, it is shot through with social meaning, it is politicised and fil-
tered through the cultural lens of those applying it in ways that technological 
determinist accounts belie.‖). 
 76. Victor Tadros calls offenses that pick out particular groups as impos-
ing greater risks ―individualized‖ and argues they violate equality: 
[W]e should be particularly concerned with laws that violate equal 
treatment in the second sense: that pick out some individuals as par-
ticularly risky. A man below the age of twenty-five can see that driv-
ing above a certain speed is likely to be dangerous, but he cannot see 
himself as posing an extra risk of driving dangerously because of his 
age. Hence, these laws normally fail to engage citizens in terms that 
they could accept for themselves as justified. And in that sense they 
treat individuals as objects of control rather than as citizens to be en-
gaged with. 
Victor Tadros, Justice and Terrorism, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 658, 684 (2007). 
But see SCHAUER, supra note 23, at 106 (arguing that a court‘s refusal to ad-
mit naked statistical evidence ―is a product of two significant mistakes: an 
overconfidence in the empirical reliability and even the very directness of di-
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when it applies to an individual case by affiliating that case to 
a general category of cases.‖77 The sort of evidence presented 
against a criminal defendant points to facts—the defendant can 
dispute those facts by, for example, pointing to evidence that 
raises doubt as to whether he was present, or had the mental 
state, or lacked a justification. On the other hand, naked statis-
tical evidence does not point to anything that a detainee can 
disprove. An eighteen-year-old African American man who is 
unmarried and unemployed is statistically more likely to offend 
than a forty-five-year-old, married soccer mom.78 The man can-
not disprove that he falls within this class—the statistics do it 
all. The evidence is nakedly statistical because it is ―informa-
tion about a category of people or events not evidencing any-
thing relevant in relation to any person or event individually.‖79 
This is one reason why the ―condition or status‖ criterion in 
Klein and Wittes‘s balancing test is so problematic.80 If all that 
the status or condition does is make it somewhat more likely 
the individual will commit the offense, then the State is still re-
lying on statistical evidence. Either way, it is an impersonal 
prediction. Although Denise Meyerson concludes that there is 
simply no way to get around this problem with respect to pre-
ventive detention, she maintains that the burden on the State 
ought to be substantial because individuals have a fundamen-
tal interest in not being mistakenly deprived of their liberty.81 
―In particular, the person should be not merely likely but very 
likely to cause harm, the harm should be grave, and the risk of 
it should be in the near future.‖82  
Practically, in detention hearings and in later follow-ups, 
the odds are against these dangerous offenders. Eric Janus de-
scribes some detention hearings as ―Kafkaesque‖: ―If a person 
 
rect evidence, and an underappreciation of the essential continuity between 
so-called indirect or statistical evidence and evidence that on its face appears 
to be more individualized and thus less statistical‖). 
 77. ALEX STEIN, FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE LAW 43 (2005). 
 78. See Steven F. Messner & Scott J. South, Demography, in 2 ENCYCLO-
PEDIA OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 494, 495 (David Levinson ed., 2002) (―The 
primary demographic characteristics of age, sex, and race are among the most 
powerful individual-level risk factors for criminal offending and victimization. 
Evidence indicates that young people, males, and members of disadvantaged 
minorities are at comparatively high risk of becoming offenders and victims, at 
least with respect to the common street crimes.‖). 
 79. STEIN, supra note 77.  
 80. See Klein & Wittes, supra note 44, at 187. 
 81. Meyerson, supra note 21, at 529.  
 82. Id. at 533. 
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acknowledges that there is a risk that he will reoffend, this is 
taken as an admission of his dangerous propensities. But if he 
states that he will not reoffend, this is taken as a lack of insight 
and is counted as a risk factor.‖83 And because false negatives 
are far more politically costly than false positives, gatekeepers 
have every incentive to keep potentially dangerous offenders 
locked up.84 
A final worry is that the detention ought to be non-punitive 
and compensated for,85 but the reality is likely to look nothing 
like this. As Richard Lippke concludes, there is no easy way 
out.86 Those who are confined are likely to try to harm each 
other, so how, asks Lippke, will this look different from incar-
ceration?87 Visitation privileges will be difficult for those sus-
pected of terrorism.88 Lippke notes that even if these individu-
als are compensated, there is little they can do with their 
money.89 Lippke concludes that ―the prospects for making pre-
ventive detention symbolically or materially different from im-
prisonment are dim . . . like prisoners, civil detainees will have 
stigmatized, cramped, and truncated lives.‖90  
Scholars contend that there is a normative gap that should 
not be filled.91 The State cannot detain responsible agents. It 
 
 83. JANUS, supra note 11, at 33–34. 
 84. Morse, supra note 3, at 59. 
 85. Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029, 
1062–66 (2004) (calling for compensation of detained innocents); Michael Cor-
rado, Punishment, Quarantine, and Preventive Detention, 15 CRIM. JUST. ETH-
ICS 3, 11 (1996) (arguing the State should compensate the preventively de-
tained for their loss of liberty); Robinson, supra note 7, at 1446 (―[I]f a person 
is detained for society‘s benefit rather than as deserved punishment, the con-
ditions of detention should not be punitive.‖). 
 86. See Richard L. Lippke, No Easy Way Out: Dangerous Offenders and 
Preventive Detention, 27 LAW & PHIL. 383, 406–13 (2008). 
 87. Id. at 411. 
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 412. 
 90. Id. at 413. 
 91. One scholar who believes that a jurisprudence of pure prevention 
should be developed is Alan Dershowitz. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, PREEMPTION: 
A KNIFE THAT CUTS BOTH WAYS 56 (2006). Dershowitz gives several reasons 
for our failure to have developed such a theory already: 
It may sound surprising . . . to say that no jurisprudence governing 
preventive confinement has ever been articulated, but it appears to be 
true. No philosopher, legal writer, or political theorist has ever, to 
this writer‘s knowledge, attempted to construct a systematic theory of 
when it is appropriate for the state to confine preventively. This is so 
for a number of reasons. The mechanisms of prevention have been, for 
the most part, informal; accordingly, they have not required articu-
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must wait until a crime is committed. And, this means that 
there are times that the dangerous may pose a threat but the 
State may not interfere. 
C. LIABILITY TO DEFENSE 
This analysis within the literature has largely ignored the 
natural analogy to self-defense.92 Self-defense is a preventive 
practice. The defender can never wait until the harm occurs. 
Rather, the defender must act on a series of predictions—that 
the aggressor will not change his mind, that the police cannot 
intervene in time, that the bullet will actually hit the defender, 
and so on. 
The self-defense literature has recently spawned a distinc-
tion between permissible killing that is liability-based and 
permissible killing that is not.93 Take two cases.94 In the first 
case, a Culpable Aggressor points a gun at the defender and 
says, ―I am going to kill you.‖ In the second case, the defender 
has fallen to the bottom of a well and the defender‘s mortal 
enemy then pushes a fat man (the ―Innocent Threat‖) down the 
well to kill him.95 If the Innocent Threat lands on him, the de-
fender will die and the Innocent Threat will live. The defender 
 
late defense or justification. Moreover, there are many scholars who 
simply deny that preventive intervention, especially preventive con-
finement, really exists, or if they acknowledge the existence of these 
mechanisms, they deny their legitimacy, thus obviating the need for a 
theory or jurisprudence. Finally, it is extremely difficult to construct a 
theory of preventive confinement that neatly fits into existing theo-
ries of criminal law and democracy. 
Id. at 56–57. 
 92. Alan Dershowitz and Stephen Morse each suggest the use of a self-
defense model to justify pure prevention. They do not use the liability theory 
advanced here. See id. at 24–25; Morse, supra note 1, at 292–93. 
 93. The ―liability‖ formulation belongs to Jeff McMahan. See, e.g., JEFF 
MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 8–9 (2009) (―At least part of what it means to say 
that a person is liable to attack is that he would not be wronged by being at-
tacked, and would have no justified complaint about being attacked.‖). For 
theorists who distinguish their views as based on permissibility, but not liabil-
ity, see Helen Frowe, A Practical Account of Self-Defence, 29 LAW & PHIL. 245, 
245 (2010) (suggesting that an innocent defender may defend against anyone 
she reasonably believes will kill her); and Jonathan Quong, Killing in Self-
Defense, 119 ETHICS 507, 516–19 (2009) (discussing agent-relative permission 
to defend against even Innocent Threats). 
 94. Readers familiar with the self-defense literature will note that there is 
another category of Innocent Aggressors, who non-culpably aggress against 
another. For ease of exposition, I have omitted this category. I would group 
them with Innocent Threats. Ferzan, supra note 28, (manuscript at 2–5).  
 95. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 34–35 (1974) (of-
fering the original formulation of this problem). 
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has a ray gun with which he can disintegrate the Innocent 
Threat. Theorists struggle with whether self-defense is per-
missible in the Innocent Threat case, and many theorists be-
lieve that the culpability of the Culpable Aggressor is signifi-
cant in distinguishing whether and how much defensive force 
may be used against him as opposed to the Innocent Threat.96 
We can distinguish between the Culpable Aggressor and 
the Innocent Threat on the basis of liability. Liability in this 
context is best viewed as a limited forfeiture of rights.97 In the 
same way that we can change our rights and duties through 
contracts, promises, and permissions, liability to defense is 
about acting in a way that gives others a right to repel that  
attack.98  
One confusion here is that we seem to apply the phrase 
―self-defense‖ quite broadly to culpable attackers, innocent 
threats, and wild animals.99 Indeed, it seems that if your 
neighbor‘s television set flew at you during a tornado, you 
would justify smacking it with a tree branch by the claim that 
you acted in self-defense. Yet, although all of these actions 
share the same act in repelling an attack, they differ substan-
tially in the thing or person harmed. It is thus important to 
recognize that the justificatory structure for one type of self-
defense is not the justificatory structure for another.100 For 
purposes of this article, our focus is on Culpable Aggressors. 
By culpably threatening the defender, the Culpable Ag-
gressor relinquishes his moral complaint against the defender 
taking the aggressor at his word.101 The Culpable Aggressor 
 
 96. See MCMAHAN, supra note 93, at 159 (―It is generally agreed that the 
proportionality restriction on killing a Culpable Threat is weaker than it is in 
other cases.‖); Frowe, supra note 93, at 267–68 (arguing that Innocent Threats 
are entitled to fight back but culpable ones may not). 
 97. See Ferzan, supra note 28, (manuscript at 5–6) (examining the rights-
based view of defensive killing). Whether it is more appropriate to frame this 
as a matter of forfeiture or specification of rights is a question for another day. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. (manuscript at 2). 
 100. See VICTOR TADROS, CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 117 (2005) (suggesting 
that questions of justification and excuse be analyzed by defense tokens not 
defense types). 
 101. Ferzan, supra note 28, (manuscript at 2–3); see also Kimberly Kessler 
Ferzan, Justifying Self-Defense, 24 LAW & PHIL. 711, 731 (2005) (―[T]he person 
who culpably initiates the situation can hardly be heard to complain that the 
other actor takes her at her word.‖). ―Culpability‖ entails demonstrating insuf-
ficient concern for others. This would encompass not only acting purposefully, 
knowingly, or recklessly, but also lacking a justification or excuse for one‘s 
conduct. See Ferzan, supra note 28, (manuscript at 1–6) (outlining different 
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cannot object that his bullet might have missed, or he might 
have changed his mind, or the police might have stopped 
him.102 Rather, once the Culpable Aggressor chooses to present 
himself as a threat, he is not wronged by the defender stopping 
the threat from occurring. In other words, the Culpable Aggres-
sor acts in a way that permits the defender to act on the de-
fender‘s prediction.103 No right of the Culpable Aggressor‘s 
stands in the defender‘s way of using responsive defensive 
force. 
Although liability explains why one may kill the Culpable 
Aggressor, it cannot justify killing the Innocent Threat. The 
Innocent Threat is a mere projectile who did not even will the 
movement of his body. However, the fact that the Innocent 
Threat is not liable to be killed does not entail that it is imper-
missible to kill him. Even when someone does not deserve harm 
and even when that person is not liable to force being used 
against him, there may be instances in which it is permissible 
to use force.104 Consider necessity. If by slapping you, I can 
save five lives, then I am justified in slapping you. However, in 
such a case, I do infringe your right and it is arguable that I (or 
the five saved) owe you compensation.105 Of course, things are 
 
categories of culpability). Moreover, properly understood, purpose and know-
ledge normatively collapse into recklessness. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH 
MORSE, supra note 15, at 31–41 (―[J]ust as recklessness contemplates that risk 
impositions can be justified by certain reasons, an actor‘s purposeful conduct 
can also be justified by certain reasons.‖).  
 102. See Ferzan, supra note 28, (manuscript at 13–14) (―An actor who in-
tends to engage in an action that demonstrates insufficient concern for the in-
terests of other people can hardly complain if that action is stopped.‖). 
 103. Vera Bergelson‘s view is that this limited forfeiture shows that rights 
are conditional. ―If we were to define the principle of conditionality of rights in 
Hohfeld‘s terms, it would be characterized as the victims‘ power to change the 
balance of rights (in the broad sense) between themselves and the perpetra-
tors.‖ VERA BERGELSON, VICTIMS‘ RIGHTS AND VICTIMS‘ WRONGS: COMPARA-
TIVE LIABILITY IN CRIMINAL LAW 110 (2009). Bergelson explains self-defense in 
terms of this conditionality: ―If you try to kill me, you violate your duty to me 
and thus lose moral parity with me. That loss of moral parity reduces your 
right to inviolability and allows me to disregard it to the extent necessary to 
protect my right to life.‖ Id. at 105. 
 104. See Quong, supra note 93, at 517–18 (discussing agent-relative per-
mission to defend against even innocent threats). 
 105. Cf. JUDITH JARVIS THOMSON, RIGHTS, RESTITUTION, AND RISK 40–41 
(1986) (suggesting that when one acts justifiably, one infringes a right but 
does not violate it). In such cases, compensation is owed. See, e.g., Vincent v. 
Lake Erie Transportation Co., 124 N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910) (finding that 
the defendant owes compensation for justifiable trespass). But see John Ober-
diek, Specifying Rights Out of Necessity, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 140–
44 (2008) (arguing for a moral specification view wherein one simply would not 
 
162 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:141 
 
more difficult when we are comparing single lives, for example, 
the Innocent Threat and the defender.  
Innocent Threat cases are not necessity cases, but rather 
are instances of agent-relative permissions or excuse. The cru-
cial point here is that if there is a reason why you are allowed 
to kill the Innocent Threat, it is not because he has done any-
thing to forfeit his right to life, but rather, because it is unfair 
to ask you to privilege his life compared to yours.106 Thus, the 
structure of why it is we may permissibly kill an Innocent 
Threat can be easily distinguished from liability, where the ag-
gressor waives his right by his own conduct.107 The self-defense 
literature thus recognizes a distinction between those instances 
in which the aggressor as a responsible moral agent behaves in 
such a way that grounds a preventive response and those in-
stances in which the aggressor‘s own conduct does not justify 
the response but the defender cannot fairly be asked to assume 
the burden.108  
This structure has a natural application to preventive in-
terference by the State. The aggressor is a responsible agent. 
He performs an act in furtherance of a culpable intention. And, 
based on that act, it becomes permissible to stop him.109 These 
cases can be contrasted with ―pure prevention,‖ where, along 
with Innocent Threats, the question is not what the aggressor 
has done, but whether it is fair to allow the defender to re-
spond.110 Liability to defensive force provides a crucial frame-
work that allows the State to intervene against responsible 
 
have a right when another person acts justifiably toward him and arguing 
that compensation is not due). 
 106. For an argument to this effect, see Quong, supra note 93, at 517–18. 
For a more qualified endorsement, see ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, 
supra note 15, at 136–38 (suggesting that such cases may be personal justifi-
cations or excuses). 
 107. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 136–38. 
 108. Andrew Ashworth suggests that there are times when an individual‘s 
right may be overridden and preventive detention will then be justified under 
strict circumstances. Andrew Ashworth, Criminal Law, Human Rights, and 
Preventative Justice, in REGULATING DEVIANCE: THE REDIRECTION OF CRIMI-
NALISATION AND THE FUTURES OF CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 75, at 87, 104–
07. However, the suggestion above is that when there is a forfeiture of the 
right, there is no need to override it. Cf. MCMAHAN, supra note 93, at 9 (dis-
tinguishing liability from overriding a right). 
 109. I owe the focus on ―prevention intervention‖ to Alan Dershowitz. See 
DERSHOWITZ, supra note 91 (discussing the history and future of ―preventive 
intervention‖). 
 110. Cf. id. at 245–50 (raising considerations relevant to whether it is fair 
to allow the defender to respond). 
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agents based on the exercise of their agency and not mere 
naked statistical evidence that they will one day harm us. In 
such cases, the defendant cannot claim, as a matter of substan-
tive due process, that his liberty rights are being violated when 
he is the one who has effectively forfeited those rights. 
II.  FROM SELF-DEFENSE TO PREVENTIVE 
INTERFERENCE   
With liability-based self-defense, it is the aggressor‘s cul-
pability in presenting a threat or making the defender believe 
the aggressor presents a threat that grounds liability.111 If you 
make someone believe you are going to hurt him, you forfeit 
your moral complaint against him stopping you.112 Likewise, I 
have argued that initiating criminal conduct should be suffi-
cient for a preventive response from the State. In this section, I 
make conceptual space for this sort of liability, suggesting pre-
ventive interference may replace some inchoate crimes. I then 
consider what it is that an actor must do to forfeit his right 
against preventive interference as well as what the State may 
do in response. Next, I turn to how self-defense is similar and 
different from preventive interference generally, ultimately 
concluding that the same normative considerations that justify 
self-defense will justify other forms of preventive intervention. 
Finally, I use an internet child-enticement case to illustrate 
how this could work in practice.  
A. MAKING CONCEPTUAL SPACE FOR LIABILITY BEFORE A CRIME 
Let us first begin with one particular conceptual space for 
preventive intervention—the time before the actor commits a 
crime. This space is currently occupied by preparatory offenses 
and attempts. These are two types of crimes where the State‘s 
goal in stopping crime is backed by punishment. Indeed, these 
 
 111. Jeff McMahan argues that one is liable if one is morally responsible 
for posing a foreseeable threat, even if it was reasonable to pose that threat. 
See MCMAHAN, supra note 93, at 166–67. For the argument that McMahan‘s 
view is too broad, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Can’t Sue; Can Kill, in CRIMI-
NAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 70, at 398, 398–400; Ferzan, supra note 
28 (criticizing McMahan‘s view that moral responsibility is grounded in nonre-
ciprocal risk imposition). McMahan‘s view, which is so expansive as to make 
individuals strictly liable, seems to be an improper starting point for our anal-
ysis. 
 112. This is subject to proportionality and necessity restraints. See MCMA-
HAN, supra note 93, at 10 (―A person cannot be liable to attack when attacking 
him would be wrong because it would be unnecessary or disproportionate.‖). 
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are areas where the State‘s preventive ends often lead to dis-
proportionate punishment.113  
The possession of brass knuckles is an example of a prepa-
ratory offense.114 The criminalization of preparatory offenses 
has nothing to do with retributive desert and everything to do 
with prevention. The justifications for the laws are that they 
allow early police intervention and ease prosecutorial bur-
dens.115 As Michael Moore notes, proxy crimes give ―liberty a 
strong kick in the teeth right at the start. Such an argument 
does not even pretend that there is any culpability or wrong-
doing for which it would urge punishment; rather, punishment 
of a non-wrongful, non-culpable action is used for purely pre-
ventive ends.‖116 Paul Robinson cautions that the use of the 
criminal law for regulatory purposes undermines its moral 
strength.117 Moreover, because these offenses include non-
culpable conduct, they risk creating a chilling effect and deter-
ring law abiding citizens from engaging in permissible activi-
ties.118  
The preventive desire is particularly evident in the rash of 
criminal statutes enacted in the United Kingdom in response to 
terrorism. Early inchoate offenses, possession, and association 
with enumerated organizations have been criminalized not 
based on the blameworthiness of the actor but the need of the 
 
 113. See Markus Dirk Dubber, Policing Possession: The War on Crime and 
the End of Criminal Law, 91 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 829, 854–55 (2001) 
(discussing the harsh penalties for drug and weapons violations). 
 114. E.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 908 (West 2010); see also Dubber, su-
pra note 113, at 835 (―By last count, New York law recognized no fewer than 
153 possession offenses; one in every five prison or jail sentences handed out 
by New York courts in 1998 was imposed for a possession offense.‖). 
 115. See Dan Bein, Preparatory Offences, 27 ISR. L. REV. 185, 201 (1993) (―I 
believe there is an additional criterion, having to do with pragmatic considera-
tions of enforcement rather than substantive considerations. It is the need to 
provide the police with the means for making preventative arrests.‖). 
 116. MOORE, supra note 16, at 784. 
 117. Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of 
Desert, 76 B.U. L. REV. 201, 211–12 (1996). 
 118. See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 23, at 229 (―[D]ata mining poses a 
substantial risk of chilling innocent citizens‘ lawful behavior. Citizens who feel 
that they are or may be under generalized surveillance are likely to have re-
duced trust in government and less willingness to participate even in lawful 
activities, whether it be attending political demonstrations, joining political 
groups, taking firearms training, or enrolling in pilot school.‖); Daniel Ohana, 
Responding to Acts Preparatory to the Commission of a Crime: Criminalization 
or Prevention?, 25 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 23, 28 (2006) (noting that criminalizing 
preparatory acts can have a chilling effect on socially beneficial activity). 
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State to intervene.119 Nevertheless, because of the profound 
dangerousness of actors, the penalties are stiff, including life 
imprisonment.120 If the goal of this punishment is truly deten-
tion and not justified punishment, then this is a clear misuse of 
the criminal law. 
There are also questions about the criminalization of in-
complete attempts. When criminal law struggles to determine 
when a defendant has gone beyond mere preparation and has 
actually attempted the offense, it struggles with two competing 
considerations.121 The first is the State‘s interest in preven-
tion.122 We want the police to be able to intervene.123 We want 
the State to stop the offender before it is too late.124 On the oth-
er hand, we want to take the offender‘s liberty and free will se-
riously.125 The common law called this the locus poenitentiae—
the opportunity that the offender ought to have to repent.126 
Indeed, the common law did not allow for abandonment of at-
tempts precisely because it placed the act requirement far 
enough along the continuum so as to already create room for a 
change of heart.127 
 
 119. See Zedner, supra note 75, at 50 (―Criminalisation of activities remote 
from the actual commission of an act of terrorism is justified by the need to 
furnish the legal grounds for action against individuals at the very earliest 
stages of preparation.‖). 
 120. See Terrorism Act, 2006, c. 11, § 5(3) (U.K.).  
 121. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 27.06[A] 
(5th ed. 2009) (―A major difficulty in drawing a line between noncriminal 
preparation and a criminal attempt is that courts are torn by competing policy 
considerations.‖). 
 122. See id. (―[T]here is the understandable desire of courts and legislators 
to ease the burden on the police, whose goal it is to prevent crimes from occur-
ring.‖). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. See id. (―[I]f courts authorize too early police intervention, innocent 
persons, as well as those with still barely formed criminal intentions—persons 
who might voluntarily turn back from criminal activity—may improperly or 
needlessly be arrested.‖). 
 126. See The King v Barker [1924] NZLR 865, 873 (CA) (noting a prior 
court‘s reasoning that when the defendant has not committed the last act in 
effectuating criminal intent and ―has stopped short of this, whether because 
he has repented, or because he has been prevented, or because the time or oc-
casion for going further has not arrived, or for any other reason, he still has a 
locus poenitentiae, and still remains within the region of innocent prepara-
tion‖). 
 127. See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW 695 (1997) (―The common law 
had no need for a renunciation defense in order to encourage potential offend-
ers to stop short of the offense. When criminal liability for an attempt attaches 
late in the process between preparation and commission, as with the common 
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Although States adopt a range of actus reus formulations 
for attempts, Larry Alexander and I have argued that to de-
serve punishment, one must unleash a risk of harm over which 
one believes one no longer has complete control.128 Notably, this 
would place punishment at the far end of the continuum, and 
police intervention in a ―crime‖ would not be possible at any 
preparatory stage.  
Even for those who believe it is justifiable to punish in-
complete attempts,129 there is the question of whether criminal 
punishment is preferable to preventive intervention. Although 
attempts prevent the harm, the State‘s criminal intervention is 
one of punishing the actor for what he has done.130 At the point 
of State interference, the incarceration (or other form of incapa-
citation) should be limited by what the defendant deserves.131  
The question is whether, when properly applied, these 
crimes are the proper tools for pursuing future preventive ends. 
Is there sufficient retributive desert in early stages of prepara-
tion to warrant any substantial intervention? For instance, 
Alec Walen argues that forming an intention can be itself a 
wrongful act of ―[f]louting the law.‖132 While Walen admittedly 
also seeks to have an act requirement (the communication of 
the threat), this act is merely evidentiary.133 But how much 
punishment does ―flouting the law‖ deserve?  
However one comes out on the punishment of inchoate 
crimes, the preventive intervention proposed here can be im-
plemented without the cumbersome machinery of the criminal 
law. Moreover, for reasons discussed below, it may very well be 
preferable. Thus, even if one is not persuaded that there are 
problems with much of our punishment of attempts and prepa-
 
law‘s proximity tests, the actor has an incentive to stop in his planned offense 
because by doing so he avoids all liability.‖). 
 128. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 216 (ar-
guing that a culpable act occurs once an actor believes he has given up control 
over an undue risk of harm). 
 129. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 121, § 27.02[A]–[D] (discussing 
the punishment of attempted crimes).  
 130. See ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 199 (―[T]he 
law cannot focus on what the action reveals about what the actor might do; 
rather, the action itself—what the actor has done—must ground blame and 
punishment.‖). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Walen, supra note 72, (manuscript at 841). 
 133. Id. (manuscript at 852). 
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ratory offenses, preventive intervention remains a viable alter-
native to the criminal law.134 
B. THE CONDITIONS OF ACTION AND INTERVENTION 
Although the applicability of the underlying justification 
for self-defense gives us a rough sense of preventive interven-
tion, it is still essential to address what specifically an actor 
must do so as to forfeit part of his liberty. This section sketches 
both how an actor may become liable to preventive interference 
and what sorts of interference measures would then be  
warranted. 
How would the liability conditions be formulated? First, 
like self-defense, the actor should be culpable—meaning that 
he either has an intention to cause harm or he is willing to un-
justifiably risk causing harm (and lacks a justification or 
excuse).135 Indeed, at this point, it appears that the State has 
good reason to intervene. The actor has decided to do some-
thing he ought not to do. 
If we are to use this regime in lieu of attempt law, then the 
next question is whether any action ought to be required. 
Should the plan to do something impermissible be sufficient for 
the State to intervene? Two rationales that are thought to un-
derlie the requirement of an action for attempts—resoluteness 
and dangerousness—might equally apply here.136 That is, in 
the attempt context, it is argued that we only want to punish 
individuals who will act on their intentions (so we know they 
are resolute in their intentions) and we only want to punish 
 
 134. One might ask why the objections to punishing formulating intentions 
do not have equal traction here. However, in those cases, the argument is that 
the defendant should not be punished for something he has yet to do and that 
the State ought to give him the opportunity to see the better of his decision 
and change his mind. The sort of preventive interference suggested here does 
not punish the actor for something he has yet to do. Although the State should 
respect the opportunity for reconsideration, it may still take seriously the ac-
tor‘s current resolve to commit the offense. The gravity of the conduct threat-
ened will determine the extent of intervention. If the actor renounces his in-
tention, the State goes away.  
 135. Although I believe that most of this analysis can be subsumed within 
recklessness, I will use the traditional framework for ease of exposition. But 
see ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 23–41 (describing 
recklessness as subjective and a function of justifiability while suggesting that 
knowledge and purpose are actually types of recklessness). 
 136. See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics 
of Preemptive Action, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 
10) (on file with authors) (explaining the roles of resoluteness and dangerous-
ness in criminal attempt).  
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those who are truly dangerous.137 Neither of these rationales 
seems particularly compelling in the case of preventive inter-
vention.138 Although the State may not wish to spend its re-
sources on the wishy-washy, that concern is pragmatic. The 
State still has reason to intervene before the act occurs.139 Ad-
ditionally, if we truly care about dangerousness, we would need 
to see empirical data that an initial act bespeaks dangerous-
ness more than a variety of other predictive factors. So, neither 
resoluteness nor dangerousness justifies an act requirement.140 
Rather, there should be an act requirement simply for le-
gality concerns.141 We want to constrain the State.142 Allowing 
the State unfettered police power to intervene in lives based on 
mere intentions could certainly lead to abuse. An act require-
ment prevents abuse by looking for conduct that corroborates 
the criminal intention.143  
This sort of requirement, then, is about power and accura-
cy. We worry that the State may abuse its power and that, even 
when acting appropriately, it may simply get the question 
wrong. The evidentiary requirement of an act constrains the 
State from within (by increasing the likelihood of detecting in-
dividuals with culpable intentions and limiting false positives) 
and without (by requiring the State to produce evidence to a 
fact finder that cannot be speculative or arbitrary).144 
Once the actor has performed an action in furtherance of 
his culpable mental state, what can the State do? We know 
what self-defense looks like—typically some sort of physical in-
 
 137. Id. 
 138. I would argue that they are not compelling arguments for the pu-
nishment of attempts either. See id. (manuscript at 10–12). 
 139. DRESSLER, supra note 121. 
 140. Id. (manuscript at 12) (―Substantial steps only prove . . . that the 
culpable intention exists . . . . Nevertheless, it is the intention, not those steps, 
that has to be the culpable element . . . .‖). 
 141. See SLOBOGIN, supra note 66, at 117–18 (―Many preventative deten-
tion rules require an overt act before detention may take place.‖). 
 142. See generally DRESSLER, supra note 121, § 5.03 (discussing the risk of 
arbitrary or discriminatory law enforcement practices under vague criminal 
legislation); SLOBOGIN, supra note 66, at 115 (noting the problem of giving the 
State too much power in the context of prevention). 
 143. Id. at 119–20. 
 144. Although I am not advocating a substantial step requirement or other 
significant actus reus formulation, I admit that the further along the conti-
nuum, the more the act constrains the state. Thus, even if a substantial act is 
not morally required for liability, it could be justified on political grounds. 
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jury to an attacker that is aimed at stopping the attack.145 But 
once we think of prevention beyond the prospect of preventively 
detaining people, what sorts of measures are we talking about? 
There are a range of measures the State may take. First, it 
may detain the individual. However, there are other measures 
that may also substantially interfere with an individual‘s liber-
ty short of incapacitation. Great Britain used a control order, a 
construct of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA).146 
Admittedly, these control orders were subject to significant 
scholarly criticisms, and this example is not intended as a pro-
posal the United States should adopt whole cloth.147 Indeed, the 
British government announced in 2011 that it planned to ab-
olish control orders and replace them with ―terrorist, preven-
tion and investigation measures.‖148 However, there is little dif-
ference between the two and control orders remain useful to 
illustrate how to begin to conceptualize preventive action short 
of punishment.  
The non-derogating control order allows the Home Secre-
tary to impose numerous restrictions on those whom he has 
―reasonable grounds for suspecting‖ are or have been involved 
in terrorism-related activity.149 The PTA provides for just about 
every preventive intervention one can imagine. Specifically, 
what the person possesses, what activities he engages in, where 
he works, with whom he associates in and outside of his home, 
where he can go, when he can be outside his home, whether he 
maintains his passport, when and how his property may be 
searched and retained, whether he is photographed, and 
 
 145. E.g., DRESSLER, supra note 121, § 18.06[A][1][a] (―Subject to various 
limitations, a person is justified in using force upon another person if he be-
lieves that such force is immediately necessary to protect himself against the 
exercise of unlawful force . . . .‖ (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962)). 
 146. Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2005, c. 2 (U.K.).  
 147. See Tadros, supra note 76, at 670 (―The present use of control orders 
seems very difficult to justify . . . .‖); Zedner, supra note 75, at 48–49 (―[T]he 
control order is . . . an extraordinary measure that does serious damage to ba-
sic presumptions of criminal procedure.‖); Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice or 
Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control Orders, 60 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 174, 
176, 181 (2007) (critiquing the Prevention of Terrorism Act‘s low burden of 
proof, unjust supervision of those who associate with the target, and damage 
to family relations). 
 148. See Ryder, supra note 26. 
 149. Prevention of Terrorism Act, c. 2, § 2 (U.K.). 
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whether he is electronically monitored are all possibilities un-
der this provision.150  
Unlike control orders, it is clear that we would want to de-
signate some fact finder, to determine by a constitutionally set 
standard (perhaps, clear and convincing evidence) that an actor 
harbors a culpable mental state, has committed an action in 
furtherance of that mental state, and plans to complete the of-
fense. Then, an agency would need to be tasked with supervis-
ing the actor in ways designed to prevent the commission of 
that particular crime. This supervision would be reconsidered 
at specific times, and supervision would cease once the State 
could no longer meet the burden of demonstrating that the de-
fendant continued to harbor an illicit mental state.151 
Another question is the extent to which such a regime 
might mandate rehabilitation. I take this to be a more difficult 
question. Certainly, if Joe plans to rob a bank, the State may 
stop Joe from so doing. But it is far more questionable whether 
the State should intervene by mandating that Joe attend coun-
seling sessions or get involved in community service, as these 
sorts of interventions require that the State stop Joe by chang-
ing him. It may be that given some sorts of intention, and par-
ticularly in those cases where rehabilitative intervention 
works, the State might want to give candidates the option of 
this sort of interference in lieu of another. For instance, drug 
addiction intervention may be less costly in preventing crime 
than merely monitoring an addict.152 But widespread charac-
ter-changing interventions strike the wrong balance between 
liberty and security. We cease to respect personhood when we 
 
 150. Id. at c. 2, § 1(4); see also Ohana, supra note 118, at 25–26 (discussing 
preventive restrictions). 
 151. Cf. Ohana, supra note 118, at 26 (―[P]reventive measures should be 
precluded in cases in which the actor proves that he has abandoned the unlaw-
ful endeavor as the result of a genuine change of heart. Indeed, given that the 
actor has voluntarily relinquished the pursuit of his unlawful endeavor, there 
should be no need for restrictions to negate the risk that he will try once again 
to execute his unlawful plan.‖). 
 152. Michael Corrado suggests that it is inhumane to punish the addict 
without treatment. Corrado, supra note 65, at 106. He argues that if the ad-
dict cannot control his behavior then we can detain him and fix him. See id. at 
107. This rationale is a community- or defender-based model of pure preven-
tion. At issue here is the question of whether we can require rehabilitative 
change of the responsible. 
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try to change the person. Indeed, the retributive turn was a di-
rect response to the failure of the rehabilitative ideal.153  
Because this is a civil regulatory measure, the constitu-
tional protections differ from criminal guarantees. As Stephen 
Schulhofer notes, the civil-criminal divide plays an important 
role in Supreme Court jurisprudence, but some criminal rights 
apply in civil cases.154 Schulhofer maintains that some criminal 
safeguards should not apply to the preventive detention of sex-
ual predators, including, ―the right not to be a witness, the 
right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the protections 
against double jeopardy and ex post facto laws.‖155 Indeed, 
Schulhofer goes so far as to claim, ―I cannot readily imagine a 
genuinely civil proceeding, one designed primarily for preven-
tive or regulatory rather than punitive purposes, for which it 
would be appropriate to grant a defendant the right not to testi-
fy and the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.‖156 This 
Article will not attempt to delineate what standards ought to 
be applied. Kansas‘s sexually violent predator statute, consi-
dered in Hendricks, required proof beyond a reasonable doubt, 
access to defense counsel, and access to a professional mental 
health evaluation.157 It is clear that the regime suggested here 
would have to develop its own constitutional dimensions to 
guarantee that liberty is not broadly sacrificed, but there is no 
reason to think that a broad constitutional jurisprudence could 
not be developed for these cases.  
 
 153. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISH-
MENTS xxxviii (1976) (―[T]he rehabilitative model, despite its emphasis on un-
derstanding and concern, has been more cruel and punitive than a frankly pu-
nitive model would probably be. Medicine is allowed to be bitter; inflicted pain 
is not cruelty, if it is treatment rather than punishment. Under the rehabilita-
tive model, we have been able to abuse our charges, the prisoners, without 
disabusing our consciences. Beneath this cloak of benevolence, hypocrisy has 
flourished, and each new exploitation of the prisoner has inevitably been in-
troduced as an act of grace.‖). 
 154. Schulhofer, supra note 2, at 78–80 (noting that ―the civil-criminal dis-
tinction is one that the Supreme Court continues to take seriously,‖ but the 
Court‘s ―juvenile court jurisprudence illustrates . . . a functional approach, in 
which the civil and criminal labels ultimately play no role in determining doc-
trinal outcomes‖). 
 155. Id. at 81. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 352–53 (1997).  
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C. ASSESSING THE SIMILARITIES 
How does preventive interference compare to individual 
self-defense? Self-defense is a preventive practice.158 What the 
defender does is to stop the harm from occurring.159 It is not 
reactive, after-the-fact conduct—that is, it is not retaliation.160 
Any preventive interference is likewise, well, preventive. It is 
designed to stop a crime from happening. 
When a culpable aggressor attacks his victim, the culpable 
aggressor waives his moral complaint against the defender act-
ing preemptively.161 Indeed, the defender does not wrong the 
aggressor even if the bullet would have missed or the aggressor 
would have changed her mind.162 The aggressor‘s actions 
ground the defender‘s right to respond.163  
When a defender responds, his defense is limited to those 
actions that are aimed at stopping the threat.164 A non-deadly, 
minor attack may not be met with deadly force.165 Nor may a 
defender use force that he knows is not necessary to stop the 
threat.166 
 
 158. ALEXANDER & FERZAN WITH MORSE, supra note 15, at 109. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See Ferzan, supra note 28 (arguing culpability is the basis for moral 
liability); Frowe, supra note 93, at 265–66 (claiming that culpability is gener-
ally sufficient to render an actor liable to defensive force); Quong, supra note 
93, at 519 (―[Y]ou have waived or forfeited your permission to act in self-
defense if you have voluntarily done any one of a number of things that would 
also constitute waiving or forfeiting your right not to be killed. These actions 
include but are not necessarily limited to consenting that X may kill you, at-
tempting to kill or gravely injure X (or some other innocent person) without 
his consent when X poses no threat to you, intentionally causing X (or some 
other innocent person) to believe that you are attempting such an act, or oth-
erwise being culpably responsible for initiating a threat to X‘s life.‖). 
 162. See Ferzan, supra note 28, (manuscript at 18) (asserting that a self-
defense argument does not depend upon the aggressor‘s success); Ferzan, su-
pra note 101 (arguing a culpable aggressor‘s attack gives the defender the 
right to act on her prediction); Frowe, supra note 93, at 265–66 (contending 
that a culpable actor with an unloaded gun is liable to defensive force); Quong, 
supra note 93, at 519 (causing someone to believe you will kill them renders 
you liable to defensive force). 
 163. See Ferzan, supra note 28, (manuscript at 23–25). 
 164. Id. (manuscript at 22). 
 165. See, e.g., 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 152 (2011) (―Use of deadly force is 
‗reasonable‘ if the actor is in fear of a proportionate harm or force against him 
or her.‖). 
 166. See, e.g., id. (―Where self-defense is warranted, the defendant is not 
expected to have perfect judgment, but he or she is required to have a good 
faith belief in the necessity of using deadly force.‖ (citation omitted)). 
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This structure likewise justifies preventive interference 
generally. An actor, who, say, lies in wait with an intention to 
kill, is liable to preventive interference. He has begun a course 
of criminal conduct that he has no right to engage in. He has 
done enough to reveal his current plan that the State may in-
tervene and stop him, even if it does not yet have a right to  
punish him for attempting to kill. 
Importantly, the argument is not that the State is engag-
ing in self-defense. Rather, the argument is that the underlying 
moral permissibility of engaging in preventive acts may turn on 
the aggressor‘s own culpable action in creating the threat and 
then becoming liable to actions aimed at stopping it. 
Moreover, in the same way that self-defense is constrained 
by proportionality and necessity, so, too, is State interference. 
A State may not preventively detain an individual who may be 
stopped with electronic monitoring. Like individual self-
defense, the State‘s behavior will be constrained by the nature 
of the threat and its likelihood, and the range of responses and 
their likely effectiveness. 
In both cases, the normative structure is the same. When 
someone attacks you, you may stop them. Preventive interfe-
rence is one way the State may stop an attack on legally pro-
tected interests. 
Importantly, what justifies the State‘s interference is not a 
general prediction based on facts about the actor, but what the 
actor has done. Liability-based prevention does not treat an in-
dividual as ―bad bacteria,‖ assuming that one‘s race or genetic 
makeup can predict future wrongdoing. Rather, the liability-
based view takes seriously that we are all authors of our own 
destinies. It is the actor‘s conduct in choosing to engage in this 
early behavior that gives us grounds for concern. This view of 
prevention respects autonomy. 
D. EVALUATING THE DIFFERENCES 
Although self-defense seems to be but a species of the ge-
nus of preventive practices, it seems to have unique charac-
teristics that differ from the sort of preventive interference 
suggested here. First, self-defense requires the attack to be 
imminent. Second, the nature of a self-defensive response is of 
limited duration. 
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The first difference is when interference may begin. We 
may act in self-defense when a harm is imminent.167 On the 
other hand, the entire point of preventive interference is to in-
tercede prior to imminent attacks. 
I do not believe this difference is an objection. Theorists 
give three reasons for imminence: (1) to ensure that defensive 
harm is truly necessary;168 (2) to apportion power between the 
citizen and the State;169 and (3) to serve as the actus reus for 
aggression.170 But none of these rationales have any traction 
for requiring the State to wait until an attack is imminent. 
 
 167. See, e.g., id. (―[T]here must have been reasonable grounds for his or 
her belief, that the accused was in imminent danger of loss of life . . . at the 
hands of the person killed [i.e. the attacker].‖). 
 168. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making 
Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 279 
(2002) (―Because the requirement of imminency is an imperfect proxy to en-
sure that a defendant‘s use of force is necessary, a better standard would re-
quire that the use of force be necessary.‖); Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, 
Imminence, and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REV. 371, 380 
(1993) (―In self-defense, the concept of imminence has no significance indepen-
dent of the notion of necessity. It is, in other words, a ‗translator‘ of the under-
lying principle of necessity . . . .‖); Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman 
Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and 
Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 45, 69 (―Immediate necessity, not imminence of 
harm, should be considered essential to self-defense claims, including those 
asserted by battered women.‖); Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender Question in 
Criminal Law, SOC. PHIL. & POL‘Y, Spring 1990, at 105, 127–28 (―Imminence 
is relevant only because it helps identify cases where flight or legal interven-
tion will be impossible, so that violent self-help becomes truly necessary. The 
decisive factor is necessity, not imminence per se. Thus, the proper approach 
is . . . to require, as proposed in Model Penal Code § 3.04, that the use of force 
be ‗necessary on the present occasion.‘‖). 
 169. See George P. Fletcher, Domination in the Theory of Justification and 
Excuse, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 553, 570 (1996) (―[W]hen an attack against private 
individuals is imminent, the police are no longer in a position to intervene and 
exercise the state‘s function of securing public safety. The individual right to 
self-defense kicks in precisely because immediate action is necessary. Individ-
uals do not cede a total monopoly of force to the state. They reserve the right 
when danger is imminent and otherwise unavoidable to secure their own safe-
ty against aggression.‖); Whitley R.P. Kaufman, Self-Defense, Imminence, and 
the Battered Woman, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 342, 354–60 (2007) (arguing im-
minence partitions power between the citizen and the state); V.F. Nourse, Re-
conceptualizing Criminal Law Defenses, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1691, 1725 (2003) 
(―[T]he doctrine of self-defense insists that the threat be so imminent as to 
prevent lawful recourse and often emphasizes this fact by requiring retreat.‖). 
 170. Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Defending Imminence: From Battered Wom-
en to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 257–58 (2004); see also Joshua Dressler, Fe-
minist (or “Feminist”) Reform of Self-Defense Law: Some Critical Reflections, 
93 MARQ. L. REV. 1475, 1491–92 (2010) (noting that imminence distinguishes 
offense from defense). 
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First, with respect to making sure that an action is truly neces-
sary, as noted above, the liability approach does not require 
that the actor would have committed the crime—it is sufficient 
that the actor do enough to intentionally create the appearance 
that he will commit the offense. In other words, if there is a 
false positive as to the necessity of stopping the culpable actor, 
it is the actor‘s fault.171 That is, once an actor becomes liable to 
preventive interference, the responsive action need only be sub-
jectively necessary. Moreover, because the intervention does 
not harm the actor in the same way that defensive force can 
(especially deadly defensive force), the harm suffered by an un-
necessary intervention is less significant. If the State inter-
venes unnecessarily because the actor causes the State to be-
lieve intervention is necessary, this minimal harm is not 
sufficiently substantial so as to warrant an imminence re-
quirement for preventive interference.  
The second role that imminence supposedly plays is parti-
tioning power between State and citizen. It is hard to see why 
the State should have to wait for the attack to be imminent, as 
this view of imminence presupposes that the State can do 
something prior to the imminent act. True, we do have attempt 
laws. But do we not want some role for the State prior to the 
crime occurring? Hence, if the citizen ought not preventively in-
tervene (through self-defense) if the State can act earlier, then it 
ought to be the case that the State is justified in acting earlier.  
The final role for imminence is serving as the actus reus of 
aggression. Simply put, you cannot defend against something 
that is not already an attack. As a conceptual matter, we cer-
tainly need an attack before we can have a defense, but the 
more essential normative matter is the question of what an at-
tacker must do to forfeit his right against attack. How far must 
he come? The answer is not very far. If we have clear evidence 
of intention, and some overt action that corroborates the inten-
tion, the actor is already doing something that he ought not do 
and ought to think the better of. Although citizens should be 
free to think illiberal thoughts, and even to consider crimes 
they later reconsider, early planning with an intention to com-
plete that plan is sufficient to waive a right to interferences 
aimed at foiling the plan or forcing reconsideration. The actor 
 
 171. Admittedly, there may be false positives as to whether a person is a 
culpable aggressor. The point above, however, is that once someone is a culpa-
ble aggressor, he cannot complain that responsive defensive force was not ob-
jectively necessary. 
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can be held to stand and account for his intention, even if he 
may later change his mind or his plan is conditional in myriad 
ways. The mere holding and initial acting upon an illicit plan, 
as currently formulated, is sufficient to allow intervention.172 
A second difference between self-defense and preventive 
interference is the nature of the response. Self-defense, even 
non-deadly, is short-lived. The defender stops the attack with 
some use of force and the incident is over. The police may ar-
rive after the fact to sort out criminal responsibility. The ques-
tion would be how we would limit preventive interference. 
Once again, preventive intervention follows self-defense‘s 
structure. The fact that someone is attacking you does not give 
you carte blanche to do as you will with your attacker. Rather, 
the attacker has waived a right to defensive force. In the case of 
preventive intervention, the State may intervene in a way that 
is necessary and proportionate to prevent the crime threatened. 
Becoming liable to preventive intervention is not a complete 
abdication of one‘s rights. It simply justifies the State in taking 
appropriate measures to prevent the actor from committing 
that offense.173 
E. AN APPLICATION: ―TO CATCH A PREDATOR‖ 
We are all aware of the televised sexual predator stings.174 
The structure of these sexual predator stings runs along the fol-
 
 172. What if the actor fluctuates between a belief that would make his act 
justifiable and one that would not? Assume that Larry hates Heidi and be-
lieves she is a terrorist and forms the intention to kill her to stop her from 
harming others. He later begins to doubt that she is a terrorist, but still wants 
to kill her. If Larry‘s beliefs fluctuate, may the State intervene? The answer is 
that the State may intervene when Larry acts on a culpable intention (killing 
someone who is not a terrorist) and may continue to intervene until Larry ab-
andons that culpable intention. As a practical matter, the State is unlikely to 
be required to make weekly showings that the actor harbors the culpable in-
tention, and therefore will retain some authority over the actor during some of 
these fluctuations. 
 173. Cf. BERGELSON, supra note 103, at 91 (―[A] person who while acting in 
self-defense applied more force than reasonably necessary is responsible only 
for that ‗extra‘ force because the aggressor has lost his right not to be attacked 
at all but retained a right not to be attacked with a disproportionate amount of 
force‖); SLOBOGIN, supra note 66, at 113–15 (arguing that the nature and du-
ration of preventive interference should bear a reasonable relationship to the 
harm threatened). 
 174. E.g., Dateline: To Catch a Predator (NBC television broadcast Dec. 28, 
2007). For a transcript of a typical episode of one such show, see Chris Hansen, 
Potential Predators Go South in Kentucky, MSNBC (Jan. 9, 2008), http://www 
.msnbc.msn.com/id/22423433/ns/dateline_nbcto_catch_a_predator/. 
 
2011] BEYOND CRIME AND COMMITMENT 177 
 
lowing lines: Have a police officer or other adult pose as a child 
in an Internet chatroom. Wait until some actor proposes having 
sexual contact with the child. Arrange a meeting place. Ask the 
actor to bring some sort of gift—generally, items designed to 
show (1) the actor is trying to romance a child and (2) the actor 
knows the other person is a child (for example, ―Please bring 
beer and cigarettes because I am only in junior high.‖). When 
the actor arrives, have him see the minor with whom he in-
tends to have sexual contact. Have the minor leave and then 
humiliate the target with a television interview.  
How would this work under a preventive interference re-
gime? At the point in time when the actor communicates his in-
tention to have sexual relations with the child, intervene. The 
State might put an electronic monitor on him, have the right to 
search his computer and home at unexpected times, and bar 
him from being within so many feet of a school. With his con-
sent, he could meet with a counselor. His case could then be re-
viewed in six months to determine whether he still harbors the 
intention to have sexual contact with a minor.175  
III.  ASSESSING LIABILITY TO PREVENTIVE 
INTERVENTION   
Preventive measures have traditionally been criticized 
along three lines. First, critics argue that pure prevention fails 
to take autonomy seriously. Second, critics claim that preven-
tion circumvents the criminal process. Third, critics argue that 
preventive measures are extraordinarily expensive. In addition, 
with respect to this proposal, a critic might question whether 
liability to preventive intervention can be conceptually and 
normatively distinguished from pure prevention. This section 
looks at liability to preventive interference along these lines of 
critique and argues that liability to preventive interference 
takes autonomy seriously, is appropriately characterized as civ-
il, is less expensive than many other means of detention, and 
provides a principled rationale that will prevent slipping down 
the slope to pure prevention. 
A. TAKING AUTONOMY SERIOUSLY 
As discussed in Part II.B., there are serious concerns with 
a pure preventive system. Among the issues with pure preven-
 
 175. See infra Part III.D (discussing the length of intervention and the 
burden of proof). 
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tion are that such intervention fails to take people‘s autonomy 
seriously, to announce rules, to give individuals opportunities 
to comply, and to treat individuals as responsible agents when 
we punish them.  
Although the account offered here is not one of pure pre-
vention, some might argue that this proposal also fails to take 
autonomy seriously. Antony Duff argues that early preparatory 
steps should not be criminalized for reasons that may have 
equal applicability to this proposal.176 He claims that to respect 
someone‘s freedom, the State may only intervene by trying to 
dissuade the potential offender, but if ―instead we intervene 
forcibly to prevent him advancing his criminal enterprise, we 
cease to treat him as a responsible agent: we deny him the 
freedom to decide for himself whether to desist; we pre-empt 
his future actions by force, and thus infringe his autonomy.‖177 
However, it is unfounded to claim that we may not inter-
fere with someone‘s criminal plans. We do it all the time. We 
lock our doors, alarm our cars, and protect our valuables. We 
certainly do not claim that criminals ought to have unfettered 
ability to commit crime and that any restrictions on that free-
dom interfere with their autonomy.178  
The State is also permitted to limit our freedom in myriad 
ways for good reason. As Michael Corrado notes, it collects tax-
es, jails convicts, requires schooling, and compels military ser-
vice.179 Protecting citizens‘ security is a good reason for State 
interference.180 Indeed, Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner do 
not argue that ―social crime prevention‖ (―organizing activities 
to take (young) people away from crime‖) and ―situational crime 
prevention‖ (―target hardening, opportunity reduction, and se-
curity systems‖) are not also preventive measures by the 
 
 176. R.A. DUFF, CRIMINAL ATTEMPTS 389 (1996). 
 177. Id. 
 178. For an analysis of ―preemptive enforcement‖ where the government 
makes it impossible to commit a crime (for example, requiring Internet service 
providers to block child pornography), see generally Daniel Rosenthal, Assess-
ing Digital Preemption (and the Future of Law Enforcement?), 14 NEW CRIM. 
L. REV. (forthcoming fall 2011) (on file with author) (discussing preemptive 
enforcement in the context of digital technologies). 
 179. Corrado, supra note 51, at 803. 
 180. See Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 15, at 279, 281 (―Any account of 
the state‘s obligations towards citizens ought surely to include the obligation 
to take all reasonable measures to protect people from death or serious physi-
cal harm.‖). 
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State.181 Rather, Ashworth and Zedner argue that they are less 
intrusive, and that to preserve liberty, the State should always 
prefer these less intrusive measures.182 
Most importantly, the model proposed in this Article is at 
root a model of agency, not prediction. This is not about some-
one‘s characteristics, or reference class, or diagnosed dange-
rousness. The preventive interventions defended here are de-
signed to react to criminal intentions—to redirect criminals, 
prevent their planned crime, and perhaps even aid in the pros-
ecution of the crime if the criminals slip through our hands. 
This model is premised upon the actor‘s choice. I respect your 
autonomy when I take your promises seriously, and I respect 
your autonomy when I take your threats seriously as well.183 
Indeed, as Daniel Ohana notes, Duff ‘s position does not 
register any distinction between someone who has begun a 
criminal enterprise and someone who has not: 
Duff ‘s principled objection to any form of preventive intervention vis-
à-vis the actor (aside from dialogue) means that an actor who has en-
gaged in acts preparatory to the commission of a crime is to be ad-
dressed in a manner that does not differ essentially from the manner 
in which the law addresses other citizens who benefit fully from the 
―presumption of trustworthiness.‖ But surely there is a significant dif-
ference in moral status here. The actor who performs preparatory ac-
tions will not be worthy of the trust of fellow members of the commu-
nity to the same extent or in the same manner as law-abiding citizens 
who do not even entertain thoughts of engaging in criminal activity or 
who, even if they do, refrain from taking concrete steps toward bring-
ing them to fruition. To be sure, the actor did not actually do wrong. 
However, he did falter . . . [and] his normative relationship to fellow 
members of his community has been tainted.184 
Similarly, Michael Corrado notes that he ―cannot imagine 
a more basic right of the community than to use the instrument 
of the law to restrain those who currently intend—in the strong 
sense of ‗intend‘ which imports the beginning of an effort to 
harm—to commit a crime.‖185 The idea that Corrado champions 
is punitive restraint, which he too distinguishes from pure pre-
vention. Corrado, a frequent critic of pure prevention, recogniz-
 
 181. Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive Orders: A Problem of 
Undercriminalization?, in THE BOUNDARIES OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 59, 74 
(R.A. Duff et al. eds., 2010). 
 182. Id. 
 183. This model thus stands in contrast with Slobogin‘s, as Slobogin‘s re-
gime sends the following message: ―You have done something harmful, which 
you must not let happen again.‖ SLOBOGIN, supra note 66, at 156–57. 
 184. Ohana, supra note 118, at 33 (citation omitted). 
 185. Corrado, supra note 51, at 790 n.60. 
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es the promise in such a middle ground, though he never de-
fends it in detail.186 
B. TAKING SIDES ON THE CIVIL-CRIMINAL DIVIDE 
This proposal stands at the center of the civil-criminal di-
vide. Retributivists reject punishing these actors because they 
have yet to do anything blameworthy.187 However, theorists 
likewise reject viewing the State‘s intervention as civil because 
the criminal process allows for greater procedural protections 
than exist in the civil regime.188 
One concern is legality. Citizens want notice of when some-
thing becomes the State‘s business.189 The State seems to have 
tremendous power to intervene.190 But there is no reason to as-
sume that the bases for preventive intervention cannot be deli-
neated—indeed, this proposal takes conduct that is now deli-
neated as criminal and recasts it as grounds for preventive 
regulation. As a matter of notice, this proposal is not proble-
matic because the conduct is tied to the criminal law. 
Following Slobogin, it is also advisable that the person 
have committed an act prior to any State interference.191 Here, 
an act requirement to limit State abuse seems appropriate. 
That is, though we may think that the mere formation of an in-
tention grounds a right of proportionate response, there are 
grounds for concern if the State has sweeping authority to in-
tervene with thought crimes. However, once the actor has per-
 
 186. See id. (―Separating out punitive restraint from preventive detention, 
conceding that someone may be punitively restrained for as long as he actively 
intends to harm another, and recognizing a certain grayness in the notion of 
‗actively intending‘ successfully would lower the heat in the debate over pre-
ventive detention.‖). 
 187. See, e.g., DUFF, supra note 176 (arguing that punishing early prepara-
tory steps abrogates autonomy). 
 188. Zedner, supra note 147, at 177–79. Zedner states: 
In sum, the Control Order is an extraordinary measure that does se-
rious damage to basic presumptions of criminal procedure. It lays 
waste to the presumption of innocence; to the right to a fair trial; to 
adversarial justice; to transparency (not least in its use of Special Ad-
vocates); and to proportionality. 
Id. at 179 (citations omitted). 
 189. See, e.g., DRESSLER, supra note 121, § 5.02 (―A statute must give ‗suffi-
cient warning that men may conduct themselves so as to avoid that which is 
forbidden.‘‖). 
 190. See, e.g., SLOBOGIN, supra note 66, at 115 (―The legality objection to 
preventative detention is that the meaning of dangerousness cannot be satis-
factorily cabined, thus allowing the state too much power.‖). 
 191. Id. at 119–20. 
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formed any act, the State has conduct that can corroborate the 
intention.192  
Beyond legality, there are procedural protections that fol-
low from delineating a restriction as criminal. And, indeed, 
some commentators claim that the protections that we asso-
ciate with the criminal process are constitutive of the criminal 
law. Thus, Ashworth and Zedner claim that the United King-
dom‘s control orders and its antisocial behavior orders are in-
stances of undercriminalization: 
Yet if the criminal law is conceived not only in substantive terms, as 
corresponding to particular principles of responsibility and liability 
for wrongdoing, but also . . . in procedural terms, as pertaining to and 
invoking a particular set of procedural practices and, most important-
ly, protections, it can be argued that recent government initiatives 
resort to criminal law too little as well as too much.193 
The problem, however, is that if a crime substantively does 
not belong within the criminal law—because it truly prevents 
offenses rather than aiming to punish the blameworthy—then 
no desire to give a regulatory civil regime criminal procedural 
protections should justify criminalizing the conduct. In such in-
stances, Ashworth and Zedner agree that when a crime does 
not satisfy substantive principles, ―it should remain a preven-
tive measure.‖194 They note that ―[d]eveloping a framework for 
preventive justice would not be a simple endeavor, but it is an 
urgent one.‖195  
It is also worth noting that the current substantive crimi-
nal law does not provide any principled check on State abuse. 
As Bill Stuntz noted, even if something ought to be punished 
because it has elements ABC, legislatures criminalize AB, leav-
ing it to prosecutorial discretion as to whether C exists.196 So, 
we may only want to punish individuals with burglar‘s tools 
who actually intend to use them, but the law leaves the intent 
element out and prohibits the mere possession of such tools.197 
 
 192. But see supra note 144 and accompanying text (stating that acts that 
are closer to satisfying a substantial-step actus reus requirement constrain the 
state more than those that are further away on the continuum). 
 193. Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 181, at 81. 
 194. Id. at 86. 
 195. Id. at 87. 
 196. William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 519 (2001). 
 197. See id. at 516 (―Possession of burglars‘ tools, which may mean no more 
than possession of a screwdriver, is routinely criminalized . . . .‖). For instance, 
the New York Court of Appeals upheld a conviction for possession of burglars‘ 
tools based on the following facts: A police officer testified that on a certain 
 
182 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:141 
 
The legitimacy of that law is based solely on a prediction that 
the offender will use the tools—but this is not something the 
prosecutor has to prove. So, no matter how many procedural 
hurdles the prosecution has to surmount—for instance the re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt—these guaran-
tees are simply circumvented by criminal codes that punish po-
tentially innocent conduct. As Richard McAdams has argued, 
the elimination of C from crime ABC to make it a crime of AB 
essentially requires the State to prove ABC by less than a rea-
sonable doubt because it removes the requirement of proving C 
altogether.198 
Moreover, because of rampant overcriminalization, prose-
cutors arrive at the bargaining table with more chips.199 And, 
at the bargaining table, prosecutors may constitutionally se-
cure waivers of myriad constitutional rights.200 Most cases are 
plea bargained, and thus, most constitutional protections have 
no real bite.201  
Now, of course, it is not appropriate to compare an idea-
lized theory of preventive interference with the non-ideal real 
world criminal law. Idealized theory of any kind will prevail 
over the perils of ordinary men. But even if we had an ideal 
 
evening he saw defendant and co-defendant walking along a deserted street 
and peering into parked automobiles. Defendant had a newspaper under his 
arm, and defendant and co-defendant stopped in front of a parked panel truck 
for about 30 seconds. The officer approached them and observed a screwdriver 
protruding from the newspaper, and the officer then arrested them and found 
a knife on defendant's person. In the officer's opinion, both the screwdriver 
and the knife could be used to break into automobiles. People v. Diaz, 23 
N.Y.2d 811, 811–12 (1969). 
 198. Richard H. McAdams, The Political Economy of Criminal Law and 
Procedure: The Pessimists’ View, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra 
note 70, at 517, 519–20; see also Tadros, supra note 76, at 687 (―[W]here the 
criminal law is absurdly broad, as it is in the UK, the right to a fair trial is 
more or less meaningless.‖). 
 199. Stuntz, supra note 196, at 520 (―Charge-stacking, the process of charg-
ing defendants with several crimes for a single criminal episode, likewise in-
duces guilty pleas, not by raising the odds of conviction at trial but by raising 
the threatened sentence.‖). 
 200. See Andrew E. Taslitz, The Political Economy of Prosecutorial Indi-
scretion, in CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, supra note 70, at 533, 534–35 
(―The law would thus permit a prosecutor to refuse to negotiate until a defen-
dant first waives his rights to receive exculpatory evidence, to challenge cer-
tain forms of prosecution evidence at trial, to bring later ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims, to raise prosecutorial misconduct objections, to waive any 
post-conviction right to raise claims of innocence, and even to waive the right 
to keep admissions made during negotiations from the jury at trial.‖).  
 201. Id. at 534 (noting that plea bargaining resolves approximately ninety 
percent of criminal cases). 
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criminal law, we would want some mechanism for the State to 
prevent crimes before they occur. And, in this idealized world, 
there is no reason why the Due Process Clause of the Constitu-
tion could not mark new territory in creating a jurisprudence of 
preventive interference.202 In crafting this jurisprudence, we 
would want to look at standards of proof, rules of evidence, ob-
ligations to reveal exculpatory information, and the like. I do 
not doubt that this will be difficult; indeed, the implications for 
terrorist investigations, which require secrecy and employ con-
fidential informants and uncover operations, would make this 
path a difficult one to chart. Nevertheless, there is no reason to 
think that the Constitution could not protect us on the civil side 
of the divide. 
There are also real benefits derived from keeping preven-
tive interference on the civil side. First, the actor is not 
branded a criminal.203 Therefore, although he may be pre-
vented from engaging in some actions—such as carrying a gun 
for a particular time period—a more general loss of rights (vot-
ing, gun possession in the future, etc.) and employment oppor-
tunities will not inevitably flow from this sort of liability. This 
will allow the actor to abandon his plan and reintegrate into so-
ciety far more seamlessly than if the criminal law were to be-
come involved.  
It might be objected that when we subject this individual to 
detention based on culpability then we are ―subjecting a class of 
defendants to stigmatic deprivations of liberty without provid-
ing them with the very protections that are designed to safe-
guard against inappropriate, stigmatic deprivations of liber-
ty.‖204 But the intent here is not to stigmatize. The State‘s goal 
 
 202. That the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution pro-
hibit depriving any person of ―life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law‖ does not preclude the creation of a civil framework for preventive interfe-
rence that respects due process. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 203. See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Pub-
lic Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 
638 (1997) (arguing in the context of community-based policing and constitu-
tional concerns about vagueness that surround loitering statutes that ―given 
the stigma that attends arrest for even a minor criminal offense, civil sanc-
tions are preferable when they are sufficient to the task, and especially when 
conduct that may pose serious community problems nevertheless fails to bear 
the hallmarks of blameworthiness associated with criminal law‖); Tadros, su-
pra note 76, at 687–88 (noting this benefit of control orders over expansion of 
the criminal law). 
 204. Memorandum from Peter Westen to author (Feb. 27, 2011) (on file 
with author). 
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is not to mark out someone as a potential criminal but rather to 
engage in acts that prompt (or force) a change of mind.205 
Moreover, this approach is not being used in order to circum-
vent greater procedural protections. If this regime requires 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, so be it. Further, as technolo-
gy progresses, the State will have a greater ability to intervene 
discretely.206  
Second, if the actor seeks to rebut that he is dangerous, 
then preventive interference asks the correct question—is the 
actor dangerous, rather than the one asked by the criminal 
law—does the actor deserve punishment.207 To put the point 
another way, the criminal law often implements overinclusive 
legislation. It prevents mature fifteen-year-olds from consent-
ing to intercourse; it prevents excellent drivers from moving at 
seventy-five miles per hour; it bars battered women who need 
to act from killing in self-defense until a threat is imminent.208 
In such cases, the criminal law has no mechanism for the de-
fendant to show that the underlying justification of the rule 
does not apply to her.209 The same problem would arise with al-
lowing preparatory offenses to be used to prevent crime. Some-
times the offenses would stop criminals who would have gone 
through with it, but other times, the crime would catch those 
who would have desisted. But the actor would have no way to 
show that he should not be incarcerated because he would have 
changed his mind. Hence, this civil mechanism, which would 
allow the actor to show that he no longer harbors the intention, 
allows the law to look directly at dangerousness; the state may 
cease to be involved once the rationale for interference no long-
er exists. 
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C. REAL WORLD PREVENTION 
Retributivism has come under fire for its ivory tower phi-
losophy, and theorists have noted that the actual application of 
retributivism in the real world requires trade-offs.210 The same 
is true of prevention. Even if an individual is liable to preven-
tive interference, the State will have to decide when and where 
to invest its resources.211 And, my claim—that there is norma-
tive and conceptual space for preventive interference—is not a 
claim that this is the best way for a government to spend its 
money, though I do believe this approach to be far superior 
(and less costly) then the current imposition of criminal pun-
ishment for inchoate and preparatory offenses. 
Indeed, we ought to approach prevention with care. We 
currently live in a world where we fear ―risks.‖212 As just one 
cautionary tale, Eric Janus brilliantly documents how our em-
phasis on sexual predator laws has done real damage.213 As he 
argues, focus on sexual predators shifts emphasis to these rare 
and unusual cases and away from the vast majority of cases—
where sexual violence is perpetrated by family and acquain-
tances. It thus marks a regressive shift in our public awareness 
of where the real dangers lie.214  
Another important concern is how these sorts of interven-
tions will affect the potential offender. Sex offender registries 
may ostracize sex offenders, preventing reintegration and re-
habilitation.215 We may also worry that we do real damage to 
 
 210. See, e.g., Cahill, supra note 17, at 819–20; Russell L. Christopher, The 
Prosecutor ’s Dilemma: Bargains and Punishments, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 93, 
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violence and to take sensible safety precautions in regard to the vast majority 
of sex offenders who are released into the community.‖). 
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non-culpable actors and family members who simply associate 
with the targeted actor. (Of course, we do real damage to the 
family when we put such people in jail.216) The State must de-
cide whether such measures cause more harm than they  
prevent. 
Finally, all measures will be expensive, and we ought to 
think long and hard about how to spend our money. Take two 
of Janus‘ thought experiments: 
By orders of magnitude, predator commitments are more expensive 
than other effective societal interventions that save lives. The cost per 
life saved by flu vaccinations is $500, by breast cancer screening is 
$17,000, and by highway improvements is $60,000. In contrast, I es-
timate the cost of preventing a single sexual crime by means of civil 
commitment to be at least $200,000 and perhaps as much as $3.25 
million.217 
And: 
In 2004, the total state expenditure in Minnesota on treatment and 
supervision of convicted sex offenders (in prison and after release in 
the community) was approximately $4.2 million. Added to the 2004 
budget of $26 million for predator commitments, the total equals the 
state‘s ―sexual violence prevention‖ fund. Commitments eat up about 
87 percent of this prevention fund but account for at most 12 percent 
of recidivist sexual crime. The state devotes only 13 percent of its 
sexual violence prevention fund to addressing the remaining 88 per-
cent of recidivist crime.218 
Because it is political suicide to be anything other than 
―tough on crime,‖ legislators keep writing checks the States 
cannot cash.219 The growing escalation of imprisonment is 
extraordinarily costly.220 This prevention alternative may allow 
potential offenders to stay within the communities and thus is 
less costly than the current (first) resort to the criminal law. 
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D. PURE PREVENTION ALL THE WAY DOWN 
Some may question whether this game is worth the candle. 
Theorists may question whether culpability has any special re-
levance because it may be possible to justify pure prevention. 
Others may worry that culpability cannot stop the slide along 
the slippery slope to pure prevention, either as a theoretical or 
practical matter.  
The first concern asks whether there is something impor-
tant about culpability. If some amount of pure prevention is 
(perhaps) inevitable, why erect this elaborate architecture? The 
answer is that culpability—and more specifically, liability—
does matter. 
Consider first the case of self-defense. When aggressors 
culpably try to kill you, you may kill any number of them. 
Culpable aggressors cannot defend against your defensive ac-
tions. Third parties can only assist you; they cannot come to the 
culpable aggressor‘s aid. You do not owe the culpable aggressor 
compensation for killing him. This structure reflects what is 
important about liability—the aggressor, by attacking culpably, 
gives up rights. 
On the other hand, defending against innocent threats and 
innocent aggressors is quite different. Even if one thinks that 
one is permitted to kill one innocent threat, it is certainly ques-
tionable whether you may kill 100 innocent threats.221 And, it 
is even more questionable whether a disinterested third party 
may intervene to help you.222 Moreover, many believe that the 
innocent aggressor or threat may defend himself.223 And some 
theorists have suggested that you will owe compensation for 
killing the innocent aggressor.224  
Our differential treatment of these cases is explained by 
the difference in rights. Culpable aggressors forfeit rights.225 
Assuming one may kill innocent aggressors and threats, inno-
cent threats and aggressors have their rights infringed.226 Ra-
 
 221. See Larry Alexander, Self-Defense, Justification, and Excuse, 22 PHIL. 
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ther than treating self-defense as a one-justification-fits-all 
construct, our analysis is clearer and sounder when we recog-
nize the difference in justificatory structure, a distinction that 
does have different implications. 
Preventive intervention is likewise distinct from pure pre-
vention. Preventive interference is justified by culpable action; 
the agent is liable to this interference and has no right against 
this interference.227 On the other hand, if we employ predictive 
technology to lock up the highly dangerous, we do so for us, not 
based on any responsibility of these dangerous actors.228  
This difference matters. First, although theorists have 
suggested that if we preventively detain individuals, we might 
owe them compensation,229 this is not the case with those who 
are liable to preventive interference. Second, just as any de-
fense against innocent aggressors and threats is highly conten-
tious but killing the culpable aggressor appears to be a ―no-
brainer,‖ preventive interference that is grounded in responsi-
ble agency is more easily justified then the complex questions 
of autonomy, security, and false positives that surround pure 
predictive models.230 Procedurally, the government should be 
required to make more substantial showings more frequently 
when interference is not justified by liability or non-
responsibility. For these reasons, culpability does have special 
relevance in justifying this predictive enterprise. 
The other concern is that there is no principled line be-
tween this proposal and pure prevention. The normative con-
cern might be expressed this way: ―Preventive intervention is 
about prediction. Given that all that liability does is give us 
grounds to make a prediction, why bother with liability? If you 
are going to predict, then predict.‖231 
To respond to this objection, one must confront two differ-
ent ways to view human beings—as mechanistic creatures in a 
causal web and as practical reasoners who are capable of re-
sponding to norms.232 In the context of the determinism debate, 
the question is whether responsibility and desert are compati-
 
 227. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
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ble with a causally determined universe.233 The compatibilist 
stance is that responsibility can be compatible with determin-
ism.234 We can be responsible even if our acts are caused. Along 
similar lines, philosophers puzzle over the possibility of pre-
punishment.235 If X is going to commit a crime, then why not 
punish X before he commits the crime? The answer must be 
that we take choice seriously, no matter how predictable, and 
we take punishment as a response to that choice seriously as 
well. 
Preventive interference can offer the same response. It 
may be that we can predict with equal confidence that both A 
and B will commit a crime. If A has formed the intention, but B 
hasn‘t, why let the intention matter? The answer is that we 
take B’s autonomy seriously by waiting. Although it may be an 
act of caring or kindness to order for a friend or spouse before 
he arrives at a restaurant, predicting—even predictable choic-
es—takes responsibility out of our hands. Liability to preven-
tive interference allows us to take autonomy seriously. 
As an example, consider the ―Anticipated Culpable Aggres-
sor‖ (ACA).236 In the self-defense context, the problem might 
arise this way: Assume that Irene knows that Joe is about to 
hear a phone message that Irene was promoted and Joe was 
not; that she believes (correctly) that Joe will form the inten-
tion to kill her over the job; and that she knows that Joe has a 
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gun in his waistband and is a quick draw.237 May Irene kill him 
before he hits play on his answering machine?238 Less theoreti-
cally, we might also question when a State may engage in 
preemptive war.239 In the context of preventive interference, 
one might expect a sexual predator to form an intention to mol-
est a child, but he may not harbor such an intention now. 
There are two ways to deal with these cases, and the an-
swer will be rather context-specific. To the extent that one har-
bors a disposition that will likely render that person irrespons-
ible later (or less responsible), the person has a duty to fix that 
character defect.240 As Michael Corrado has pointed out, how-
ever, this is not the case when the later act will itself be a re-
sponsible one—then the person‘s only duty is not to commit the 
act.241 Thus, there will be some cases in which the actor may be 
committing a culpable omission by failing to tend to a character 
defect. In many other cases, however, we cannot rely on any 
liability account. Unless an account of justifiable pure preven-
tion is forthcoming, we will have to wait until the intention is 
formed and an action in furtherance of that intention is under-
taken.  
The final consideration is the practical one. How will this 
system become any less Kafkaesque than our current preven-
tion mechanisms?242 That is, the political incentives will re-
main the same. The risk of a false negative is politically more 
problematic than the harm perceived from a false positive (par-
ticularly after the first finding of an intention).243 Moreover, 
one might worry that a fair application of the standard will 
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have the opposite effect—it will be too easy for the prospective 
criminal to lie and to be released. 
The answer lies in how this system can be constructed to 
shift the burdens as time goes on, so that the long term inter-
vention would require frequent showings of substantial proof of 
a continuing intention. Although a full defense of the mechan-
ics of this model requires a paper in its own right, let me offer 
the following possible sketch. Assume that a hardened terrorist 
states that he plans to bomb schools to strike fear into the 
hearts of Americans and he is then spotted walking around an 
elementary school to which he has no ties. Modifying the con-
trol order model, the State will be required to make a showing 
(let us assume clear and convincing evidence) to a fact finder 
that the actor intended to commit a crime and that he took a 
step in furtherance of that intention. Certainly, we want a ra-
ther high standard of proof before the State is entitled to inter-
vene. If we are going to detain the individual or otherwise re-
strict his liberty, we ought to be certain that he harbored a 
culpable mental state and has acted upon it.  
At this point, I believe the burden may be shifted to the de-
fendant to show that he no longer harbors that intention. Once 
the State has shown culpable action, it has given a clear reason 
for State intervention. The defendant only regains his right if 
he has abandoned his criminal plan. At this initial stage, it is 
not unfair to require the defendant (who lost his rights by his 
own accord and has best access to the information that would 
show he no longer has the intention) to bear the burden.  
In the terrorist example, this would mean that the State 
could present a witness who will testify that the prospective 
terrorist stated he planned to bomb schools and a witness to es-
tablish that the prospective terrorist was spotted in an elemen-
tary school to which he had no ties. This would be sufficient to 
intervene against the prospective terrorist unless he could 
show that he no longer harbors the intention. He might, for ex-
ample, testify that he does not plan to bomb the United States 
and is planning to leave the country. Now, certainly the fact 
finder has a difficult job to do. It needs to assess whether to be-
lieve the prospective terrorist. If the terrorist is an excellent 
liar, this may be difficult, just as it is in a criminal trial. How-
ever, at this point, the deck is stacked against him—he has to 
convince the fact finder that he no longer plans to commit an 
offense.  
 
192 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:141 
 
If the previous intention is found and the defendant does 
not convince the fact finder that the intention no longer exists, 
the State may proceed to intervene with the least restrictive 
means possible. It may electronically monitor, use curfews, etc. 
Violation of the set parameters can result in imprisonment. 
The length of the period of intervention before reassessment 
can be set by the gravity of the crime. The State may be en-
titled to intervene for one year for terrorism, and other espe-
cially heinous offenses, but for six months for less extreme of-
fenses. In addition, there may certainly be cases where given 
the gravity of the harm and the inability to stop it short of pre-
ventive detention, that detention itself would be called for.  
After the initial period is over, the intervention is revisited, 
with the State being required to put forth further positive proof 
that the defendant still harbors an intention, by, say, clear and 
convincing evidence. Intervention might then be justified for 
another six months, with a requirement that the State put 
forth evidence for any third or further renewal by proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt. This burden changing and shifting ap-
proach will place significant pressure on the State to come for-
ward with substantial evidence if it wishes to continue interfer-
ing in someone‘s life for a prolonged period of time. Take 
Hendricks.244 It may be that long term preventive detention 
would be justified against him so long as he (1) harbored an in-
tention to molest a child and (2) acted on it, and after that lia-
bility obtained, the State could continue to show that given 
Hendricks‘s past behavior it is likely that he continues to har-
bor that intention. This is not to say propensity or psychological 
testimony should be sufficient for liability—more is required to 
show that Hendricks did harbor a culpable intention that needs 
to be stopped. But once he truly harbors that intention, the 
State should have a wide range of proof at its disposal—
particularly given that its burden is increasing. 
In addition, not only could burden shifting be possible, but 
the type of intervention applied could vary.245 That is, when an 
individual first harbors a culpable mental state and acts upon 
it, there is significant need for intervention—and in the case of 
terrorists, significant need to intervene by detention to break 
up the criminal plans. However, as time goes on, with periodic 
evaluations, we may find that less restrictive means are  
possible. 
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  CONCLUSION   
The State has an important role in protecting its citizens. 
Yet, the State‘s hands have been tied by the view that it must 
choose between crime and commitment. There is, however, a 
third model for State intervention. The self-defense literature 
recognizes that the reason why it is permissible to defend 
against culpable attackers is because of their actions. The culp-
able aggressor‘s attack waives his right against the defender‘s 
use of defensive force. Similarly, when individuals have in-
itiated a course of criminal conduct, they, too, have waived a 
right against defensive behavior. They have waived the right 
against preventive interference by the State.  
This Article has not sought to provide grounds for every 
possible sort of preventive interference. Rather, this Article‘s 
focus has been on one type of case where the State is permitted 
to intervene, and that is the case in which the defendant has 
made himself liable to that intervention. Liability to preventive 
interference allows the State to intervene at the early stages of 
a criminal plan. It justifies the State‘s engagement in myriad 
behaviors from electronic monitoring to unannounced searches. 
Yet, it is morally limited, as what is proportionate is only that 
conduct designed to stop a particular crime. 
This approach is superior to other preventive detention 
models as it takes autonomy seriously, lies on the correct side 
of the civil/criminal divide, and is ultimately less costly than a 
resort to the criminal law and prevention through incarcera-
tion.  
Although such an approach would require a new constitu-
tional jurisprudence, it is time that one was crafted. We can no 
longer afford to contort the paradigms of crime and commit-
ment to reach the dangerous. The call is clear. Liability to pre-
ventive interference requires a jurisprudence of its own. 
